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U.S. POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
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U.S. POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1984

UNITED STATE SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Nancy L. Kassebaum (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kassebaum, Tsongas, and Dodd.

Senator KASSEBAUM. The hearing will come to order. Today's hearing on U.S. policy toward South Africa is one I have looked forward to for quite some time, as has Senator Tsongas. This is an enormously important hearing and one which I think we will have some exceptionally fine witnesses in.

Our first witness is Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He will be followed by a panel comprised of the Honorable David Newsom and Dr. Thomas Karis.

Ambassador Newsom has served as a career Foreign Service officer in the position of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He retired recently after a distinguished diplomatic career.

Dr. Karis is a professor at the City College of New York and is one of America's foremost experts on black politics in South Africa.

I visited South Africa in January 1981 and spent 1 full week in that country, which isn't long enough. It certainly was an extremely interesting, very moving visit—one in which I met with a wide range of people. It has, I think, contributed in some small way to my understanding of the complexities of South Africa and the issues that we face.

Dr. Crocker shares the commitment to contributing positively to a just and peaceful society, and we look forward to his testimony.

Do you have an opening statement, Senator Tsongas?

Senator TSONGAS. Let me begin by thanking Senator Kassebaum for conducting these hearings. I think it is important that this year not end without some kind of clear congressional interest at a minimum in what has happened in South Africa, and hopefully some statements not only of interest but of concern, and hopefully some statement as to direction as to where we are all going.

Though I am leaving the Senate, my interest in Africa will continue, though it may be in a less influential manner. I would just like to have this opportunity to question the witnesses, but also to state that I honestly believe that in South Africa there is an inevitability to black majority rule, and that is as it should be.

The only question is whether, when that happens, we are going to be on the inside looking out, or the outside looking in.

I think purely from a political self-interest perspective, change is coming. It is, as I said, inevitable and we should be riding that wave and not opposing it.

Even if one is persuaded by that, there is also the moral dilemma of how we, a nation which has made such serious strides in promoting racial harmony, can really in essence justify being, de facto, in bed with apartheid.

Although there are good intentions coming out of the State Department, history will judge these 4 years harshly, and even if history is to do that, most of history being written by whites, I think the factors that those people who care about Africa, who care about what happens in relations between the races are going, in essence, to look at the United States as having been not a participant but, at best, a disinterested observer in the continuation of apartheid.

I must say, Mr. Crocker, finally that you came before us a long time ago. And I committed to you at that point that I would sit back for 2 years and keep quiet and give you a chance to show what could be done with constructive engagement. I gave you more than that. I guess the question is, what have you given in return?

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would just like to say, Senator Tsongas, that while you may be leaving the Foreign Relations Committee and the committee room, I have no doubt but what you will still be very involved. Beginning with your days in the Peace Corps in Africa, I am sure you will continue to have an input into U.S. policy in Africa.

Senator TSONGAS. Before we begin with the witnesses, I would like to thank you for that. Every time I have been introduced for the last year, I believe people have felt compelled to say even though he is leaving the Senate, he is going to be influential.

If it is of some comfort, I don't believe that either. [Laughter.]

Senator KASSEBAUM. Maybe we both know the Senate fairly well. [Laughter.]

Senator Kennedy has submitted a statement for the record. Without objection, it will be inserted in the record at this point.

[Senator Kennedy's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

I want to congratulate the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for holding this hearing today, and I want to thank the members of this Committee for the opportunity to present this statement.

It seems to me that the recent killings and jailings in South Africa are powerful evidence to support the following propositions:

First, the people of South Africa still live with oppression in a police state that only maintains power and keeps order at the point of a gun.

Second, the plight of the people of South Africa has not improved in the past few years. They are still poor, they are still hungry, they are still landless, and they are still victimized by apartheid. There may be a "new" constitution, and there may even be an outbreak of "peace" with neighboring states. But the conditions of life for the 23 million black people who live in South Africa have not changed. If anything, life has gotten worse for the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa.

Third, the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" has been a disaster. Despite the best efforts of the Reagan Administration to put a good face on the Administration's diplomatic "initiatives" in South Africa, there is still no freedom for the people of Namibia; the forced relocation of the people of South Africa to artificially defined "homelands" has not just continued, it has increased; and that region of the world remains a tinderbox. But we have paid a high price for "constructive engagement," too. The United States has become identified with South Africa. As one expert put it, "In South Africa, the assumption that the American and South African Governments are making common cause is so widespread, that some white liberals, fearful for their reputations, have begun to shun contact with and invitations from American officials." That the United States is now generally perceived as South Africa's only friend is an affront to the fundamental values which have made this nation special to all the people of the world throughout our history.

While Pieter W. Botha was being sworn in on September 14th as South Africa's first executive president under the new constitution, violence was raging on the streets of Soweto and Durban. These two contrasting events aptly symbolized the continuing tragedy in that country.

President Botha hailed South Africa's new constitution as "the threshold of a new dawn." But the riots and violence that greeted the recent South African elections are in reality a harbinger not of dawn but of twilight, to be followed by a bitter night.

Under the South African government's program of "devolution of power," a few of the country's policies toward the small mixed-race and Indian populations are being modified. But this is merely an attempt at "divide-and-rule," one which has been overwhelmingly rejected by the very groups it is designed to appease. Meanwhile, the fundamental core of the apartheid system—the entrenchment of minority white power and the total exclusion of the black majority—remains unchanged.

The new constitution permits the so-called Colored and Indian populations to be represented in the tricameral legislature that has now been formed. Political power will remain with the 4.5 million whites, however, and the Indian and mixed-race communities will still be required to live apart from whites and even to sit in segregated chambers of the parliament. In addition, the legislative powers of the Indian and mixed-race representatives will extend only to their communities' "own affairs," which include day-to-day health and educational services but not larger social or economic issues. President Botha may believe that the "new constitution creates a wider basis for participation in the political decision-making process in South Africa than ever before," but even for the Indian and mixed-race communities the constitution is actually no more than a symbolic concession.

To their credit, these two minorities have decisively rejected white attempts to buy them off at the expense of the black majority. At the Indian elections three weeks ago, a highly effective boycott campaign resulted in only an 18 percent turnout of those eligible to vote. This level of abstentions matched that of a week earlier in the elections for mixed-race representatives, thus dealing a serious blow to the government's whole strategy.

South Africa's 23 million blacks, of course, will be prohibited from even nominal participation in the new parliament. Indeed, the new constitutional arrangements offer nothing to blacks except a continuation of apartheid and racist oppression. What is more, the projected establishment of additional black "homelands" by the white regime may eventually threaten to bring about Pretoria's long-sought goal of the creation of an all-white South Africa. When each of the first four tribal homelands received its token independence from South Africa, the blacks living in the region, including those who had been forcibly relocated there, became citizens of the new state and lost their South African citizenship. This trend suggests that when all ten homelands eventually become "independent," no blacks will remain citizens of South Africa.

Resentment about this erosion of black citizenship—a right which previously was the one thing blacks could claim under the stifling apartheid system—underlies much of the current unrest. The unrest also derives from a broader dissatisfaction with the injustices of Afrikaner rule, which the new constitution reinforces, and from economic and educational grievances, ranging from disputes over pay and rent increases to discontent spawned by rising unemployment, double-digit inflation, and the poor quality of black schools.

Reflecting these grievances, riots have spread over the past few weeks from Westonaria to Soweto, from Sharpeville to Sebokeng, from Welkom to Roodesport, and elsewhere around the country. Incidents of sabotage have been numerous in recent weeks. Shops, including those owned by Indian merchants, have been looted and de-

stroyed. At least four black town councilors who were suspected of being government agents have been assassinated, as have supporters of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement. Students of mixed-race descent have held protests, demonstrations, and boycotts at universities and colleges in several cities. Even young schoolchildren from black schools took to the streets of Natal in violent protest against the visit of a cabinet minister to the inauguration of a new local authority.

More than 60 deaths have already resulted from the recent violence, and hundreds more have been injured. Some 350–400 black gold miners were injured and seven were killed in two days of riots alone last week. Police have used tear gas, attack dogs, rubber bullets and shotguns to quell the unrest. Under South Africa's stringent security laws, which permit the authorities to proscribe all gatherings, the police arrested 500 blacks this past weekend for attending the funeral of Joseph Sithole and another 130 in Bophelong for attending an "illegal gathering." The violence has not been on the scale of the 1976 Soweto riots, when the death toll exceeded 500, but it nonetheless has made a mockery of President Botha's assertion that his government is moving "along the road . . . to create a community of peace, prosperity, and justice on the southern tip of Africa."

The developments in South Africa are necessarily a cause for concern in the United States. We and our allies have a strong interest in seeing lasting political stability come to Southern Africa. South Africa is a vital source of minerals for the West, producing 70 percent of the non-Communist world's gold, 52 percent of its vanadium, 87 percent of its platinum-metals, and similar quantities of other scarce materials. South Africa is the key strategic actor in the sub-Saharan region, not only because of its critical position along the sea lanes in the Cape of Good Hope, through which oil shipments flow to the West, but also because of its preeminent military power in southern Africa. Moreover, South Africa is the leading agricultural producer in all of Africa, and its potential contribution to the economic development and growth of other African countries cannot be understated.

But lasting political stability will never come to South Africa until racial justice is achieved and majority rule is implemented. The oppression of the black majority will inevitably be a persistent source of turmoil and instability. "The triumph of justice," as the poet Robert Ingersoll wrote 100 years ago, "is the only peace."

Our long-term strategic and economic interests in southern Africa can best be protected through the advent of majority rule and the stability it would bring. Our relations with black African countries, including such important countries as Nigeria, will best be served if we work actively to promote majority rule. That development, in turn, will help prevent further Soviet encroachments in Africa. Finally, our moral obligations and democratic values demand that we support the achievement of racial justice and majority rule.

The transition to majority rule will not come easily and will not occur overnight. But if change is what we seek, we must begin immediately to work for change, not just to talk about it. Although the lack of open revolutionary feeling and the government's extensive security apparatus make a revolution unlikely in the near or medium term, many observers have suggested that a peaceful transition in South Africa is no longer possible. If these forecasts are to be proven wrong, timing will be crucial.

"Constructive engagement" has not worked—either in reaching a settlement on Namibia or in promoting genuine reform in South Africa's domestic politics. The United States must never compromise on its position that apartheid cannot be tolerated and must be ended before normal relations between our two countries can be restored.

There are six steps we can take to help bring about desired change in South Africa.

First, the U.S. Government must express its vigorous opposition, both publicly and privately, to the system of apartheid. We must never pretend that apartheid is anything but an abomination that must be ended.

Second, the U.S. Government should immediately reimpose the export controls on equipment and supplies to the South African military and police forces that were lifted earlier this year.

Third, in keeping with this last objective, the United States must scrupulously abide by the 1977 U.N. arms embargo against South Africa. We can strengthen the embargo by paying special attention to clandestine, "dual-use," and "gray-area" violations. We must encourage other countries, including Britain, to do the same.

Fourth, we must revive our efforts with the other Western Contact Group members and the front-line African states to reach a comprehensive settlement in Namibia. An agreement was nearly at hand in the closing months of the Carter administration, but the deal fell through when the Reagan administration encouraged the

South African government to insist on a strict linkage between Namibian independence and the prior withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Today the Cuban troops are still in Angola, and Namibia is no closer to independence. The departure of Cuban troops from African shores is desirable, but it is foolish and self-defeating and illogical to insist that their removal must precede the granting of independence to Namibia.

Fifth, U.S. companies that violate U.N. Decree No. 1, which forbids foreign exploitation of Namibia's mineral resources until the region attains its independence, should be fined heavily and should have their international trading licenses suspended.

Sixth, the U.S. Government should prohibit new loans by U.S. businesses to the South African government and maintain strict supervision over all new loans to, and investments in, the South African private sector. At a minimum, such investments should be conducted in full accordance with the Sullivan Principles. We should also work to cease the extension of further IMF loans to South Africa.

Even with these six measures in place, the task of achieving majority rule in South Africa and independence for Namibia will be daunting. Setbacks and disappointments will inevitability occur. Our efforts must never flag, however, for it is only through the elimination of apartheid that lasting peace, stability, and justice can come to southern Africa.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Dr. Crocker.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD F. FUGIT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and Senator. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee and to express clearly and unambiguously U.S. policy toward South Africa, its relationship to our regional strategy of constructive engagement in southern Africa, and our view of recent events in that region.

Let us be frank at the outset by recognizing that the development of a policy that adequately reflects our moral principles, our interests as a great power, and the realities of influence and power in that distant region is one of the most thorny issues in U.S. foreign policy.

The dilemma is not that our principles and our interests are in conflict, because they are not. U.S. values and interests can only be served to the degree that there is a strengthened framework of regional security in southern Africa and a sustained process of peaceful change in South Africa. The quest for security and the imperative of change are dependent upon one another.

The challenge for U.S. policy then is to define in an operational sense how we are to pursue these goals. This means we must understand the extent of and the limits on U.S. influence, and then use that influence in a sustained and coherent manner.

This administration has been doing precisely that for the past 3½ years. There have been substantial accomplishments, but a great deal remains to be done. Our country can be proud of its record in defining an agenda of negotiated change and regional security in southern Africa, but first that record must be clearly understood.

Recent events in South Africa serve to underscore our strong moral and political convictions about a system based on legally entrenched racism. As Americans, proud of our multiracial democracy, we are offended by dramatic television footage showing police

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action to contain the explosion of black anger in the townships of the Transvaal and by headlines about a wave of detentions of opponents of the new constitution and sweeping bans on political meetings.

Such actions touch a sensitive nerve in the American body politic. They threaten democratic values that we espouse as a nation and that we believe must be reflected in our foreign policy. It was only proper that our Government was the first to voice its concern publicly at these events, as well as in diplomatic channels.

Similarly, we are united in opposition to laws and practices in South Africa or anywhere else that offend basic concepts of due process and constitutional government. The theory of apartheid is rooted in the concept of ethnicity and ethnic separation. In practice, apartheid translates as a system based on race as the organizing principle of politics and government.

Any system that ascribes or denies political rights on this basis, including the right of citizenship itself, is bound to be termed, as President Reagan has said, "abhorrent."

It should be clear, then, what we are opposed to. Our goal is equally clear: as President Reagan stated in his address to the U.N. General Assembly this week, "The U.S. considers it a moral imperative that South Africa's racial policies evolve peacefully but decisively toward a system compatible with basic norms of justice, liberty, and human dignity."

As we have repeatedly stated since the outset of this administration, we seek constructive change away from apartheid and toward a system based on the consent of the Government. This objective, too, reflects a broad national consensus. Americans reject instinctively scenarios that would have us instigate revolutionary violence and racial strife in that country with all their disastrous consequences in terms of misery and bloodshed for South Africans, their devastating results for southern Africa, and their risks of external intervention.

No serious critic of our policy dares publicly to call for the apocalypse. Our goals, those of the American people, can only be reached through a sustained process of peaceful evolutionary change. We remain opposed to the resort to violence from whatever quarter. The fruits of political violence in the world today are bitter reminders of what terrorism and counterterrorism can mean.

The real issue then, Madam Chairman, is not whether apartheid is good or bad, but rather, what is the best means of encouraging constructive change in that country? Let's start by recognizing that indignation and strong convictions do not constitute a foreign policy. The issue is how to translate these convictions into results.

While we have and we will speak out publicly to make our views known, public confrontation and rhetorical exchanges are not the main avenue for effective policy. This path has failed in the past, as its practitioners came to realize, and it is no more likely to be successful now.

Ultimately, a great power will be measured by its results.

Similarly, we have not relied on bluster, threats, or the actual implementation of new punitive measures toward South Africa. All evidence suggests that U.S. influence for change is unlikely to be increased by pinpricks such as restrictions on Krugerrand sales or

on landing rights for South African Airways. Such moves are more likely to become a show of impotence and to erode our influence with those we seek to persuade.

Our administration remains totally opposed to the concept of disinvestment or trade and investment sanctions more broadly. We fail to see how waging economic warfare against the government and people of South Africa can advance our goals or serve the interests of either the American people or the citizens of all races in that country.

Not only would such moves offer a fire sale of U.S. assets to foreign interests, damage our commercial credibility, restrict our access to an important market; in some proposals at city and State levels, such proposals raise serious constitutional issues. More important, if adopted, they could sabotage desperately needed economic opportunity for the black majority, remove the positive force for change represented by the Sullivan signatory companies, and produce disastrous consequences for those dozen African states neighboring South Africa.

Not surprisingly, an authoritative survey by a distinguished sociologist, Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer, reports that 75 percent of black factory workers oppose U.S. disinvestment. There is an Orwellion perversity in proposing such measures in the name of liberal and humanitarian goals.

The starting point in this administration's approach to South Africa and southern Africa was to recognize the nature of our influence in its regional context and to identify those constructive things we can do to advance our goals. We are one element in a complex equation. Our approach is to engage ourselves positively, to add our weight in support of American values, to back ideas, institutions, and groups that can add a dynamic for change, to propose alternatives to open doors and build bridges, not the reverse.

In the South African context, much of our influence derives, we believe, from the self-image of the South African leadership and the white minority generally as part of the West as well as of Africa, struggling to preserve its identity, to maintain its security, and to avoid isolation.

Such attitudes for much of the post-World War II period were accompanied by complacency interrupted by sudden shocks as occurred during the Portuguese revolution, the decolonization of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, and the Soweto riots of 1976. Complacency gradually in the last decade gave way to a siege mentality, heightened by internal outbursts of black anger and alienation, by an increase in cross-border guerrilla violence, by the projection of Soviet-Cuban military power into the region, and by increasingly strident Western criticism of the system.

Digging in its heels, the Afrikaner establishment which has ruled that country since 1948, developed an elaborate vision of itself as a regional superpower prepared to go it alone if necessary, to hang onto Namibia, and to bring maximum pressure to bear on neighbors which hosted guerrillas. The siege mentality included, at the time President Reagan took office, a determination above all to maintain Afrikaner ethnic unity inside the National Party and a highly abstract commitment to domestic reform imposed by the government unilaterally from above.

A central element in U.S. policy for the past 3 years has been to address the complacency and the siege mentality I have just described, and to encourage the emergence of a more favorable climate for change. Repeatedly we have emphasized the imperative of basic change, while making clear that we recognize that such change entails a process, not merely a single decision.

In our dialog with South Africans of all races, we have made clear our view that change, meaningful change, is an urgent matter. At the same time we have stressed that such change can only flow from consultation and negotiation within South Africa and among South Africans. We do not seek to impose an American blueprint.

Recognizing that the cult of Afrikaner unity was hostile to serious reform, we moderated our public rhetoric in an effort to persuade the government there to respond to the realities of the South African situation itself.

This is not the place to recount in detail the sustained diplomatic efforts we have undertaken in southern Africa to reverse the cycle of violence that risked engulfing the region in the early 1980's. I refer here to our efforts on Namibia, to our efforts to reduce violence across borders between South Africa and all its neighbors.

These efforts have been part and parcel of our South African policy. Our message to the South Africans has been to stress the benefits of cooperation and negotiation within an agenda we have put forward to all governments in the region. At the same time we have spelled out the costs and risks of failure in terms of South African interests and our bilateral relationship.

We believe the effort to define and build upon areas of common interest and mutual benefit throughout southern Africa is far preferable to simply accepting the drift toward polarization. We strongly doubt that serious internal reform is likely in a climate of constant fighting with adversaries along South Africa's borders. We know with assurance that U.S. regional interests and those of our allies are best served by a regional climate of greater stability, enhanced growth, and reduced openings for external intervention.

Today, 3 years later, we believe there is clear evidence of progress toward a more favorable climate for change. Today the state of relations between the United States and South Africa matters very much to the South African leadership. That closeness or distance in the relationship depends heavily on internal change, evidence of momentum and progress toward regional security.

Our conscious effort to relax the siege mentality no doubt played a part in enabling then-Prime Minister, now State President P.W. Botha to take the bold decision to put forward constitutional proposals which cost the National Party, the governing party, one-third of its core constituency and gained it new white voters beyond Afrikaner ranks.

Debate has raged over the question of South Africa's new constitution endorsed by two-thirds of the white electorate nearly a year ago. It is an irony that the turmoil of the past days and weeks and the repression used to suppress it should have coincided with the introduction of a constitution which, to a limited extent, offers opportunity for wider political participation. Even this slight expan-

sion of political rights to so-called "coloreds" and Asians has been seen by some whites as a threat or the thin edge of a wedge.

The fact that the new constitution made no provision for the inclusion of the 73 percent of the South African population who are black was bound to reinforce black bitterness. This administration has been consistent in pointing out this fundamental flaw in the new constitution and our opposition to the attempt to denationalize blacks by declaring them citizens of unrecognized homelands.

Nevertheless, it would be premature to dismiss the new willingness of the whites to support the concept of reform or to dismiss the potential of the new constitution for stimulating further change. The very exclusion of blacks ironically has forced the political future of blacks on top of the political agenda. State President Botha has indicated as much in his inaugural address.

The departure, in sum, from whites-only politics may well prove to have a substantial effect in South Africa. The very fact that participation in the colored and Asian elections was so low will add further impetus to existing pressure on newly elected members of these chambers to fight for change.

We believe the debate over whether this new constitution represents a step forward can only be resolved by future historians. For our part, we believe that whatever the intentions of its authors, it is an irreversible step. Its effect, precisely because of the boycotts, will be to accelerate the reappraisal of future options among whites and to erode further complacency.

We remain confident there is a new dynamic at work in South Africa, driven by socioeconomic and political requirements. This is by no means contradicted by events, the rioting of recent weeks. As de Tocqueville pointed out, this is a phenomenon that historically tends to occur precisely when rigid, old patterns are beginning to break down.

We are urging the South African Government to recognize that repression provides no lasting answer. We hope the government will recognize that it is in its own interest to release those recently detained quickly, or at the very least to charge those it has decided to put on trial without delay, so they may have a chance to defend themselves in a court of law.

We note that State President Botha himself in his inaugural address has stressed that the new system requires dialog not only among whites, coloreds, and Asians, but also with blacks. The burden now is on the government to recognize and invite valid black interlocutors to the table. It's a process we encourage, even if we have no direct role in it and do not presume to come up with prescriptive formulas.

A second feature of our efforts to back change is our quiet diplomacy on behalf of specific improvements and concrete problems of human rights and civil rights. By definition, one cannot discuss publicly the content of specific efforts. Nonetheless, while we recognize that the major impetus for change must come from within South Africa, we have actively concerned ourselves on several fronts to seek concrete improvements: Our interest in such issues as detentions and bannings—until recently, dramatically reduced—urban residency rights for blacks, forced removals of selected black communities, and the issuance of travel documents and visas have

been widely recognized in South Africa's human rights community in sharp contrast to the distant critics who may afford the luxury of dismissing such matters as mere amelioration of the current system.

We will remain engaged in endeavors such as this. We are certain the Congress and the American people would want us to be.

A third element of our approach has been to provide concrete, tangible support of those groups, institutions, and processes which are essential to change in South Africa. Through deepened contact with those who are on apartheid's receiving end and who seek the tools to promote peaceful black advancement, we have defined a series of assistance programs of which Americans can be proud.

I would like to emphasize as well that we have done so in close cooperation with the Congress, which has taken important initiatives to expand our efforts and establish new programs to assist apartheid's victims.

The Congress most recently, in response to your lead, Madam Chairman, and that of your colleague Senator Percy, has vitally contributed to enhanced opportunity for black South Africans. The humanitarian development moneys, under legislation which you sponsored this year, have gone to assist 60 projects with a total of $500,000. These projects range from assistance to education in particularly deprived areas, to the provision of law libraries to legal centers in urban areas which assist blacks to understand their options under the law. One million dollars is slated for the coming year.

Building from suggestions of Congressman Solarz during the previous administration, we have gone forward to help educate black South Africans in a program that is a model of cooperation between government and the private sector. A total of about $7.5 million, over half from the Federal Government, has brought some 350 black South Africans to the United States for advanced study. At this point, about 50 have returned to use their skills in South Africa.

We are currently seeking to expand educational assistance by instituting a program of scholarship support for university level study within South Africa. If current obstacles can be overcome in consultation with Congress, we should be able to put 70 young people into universities this year at a cost of $1 million.

Nearly $6 million has been committed in support of programs of bridging education, entrepreneurial training, and training in support of black trade unionists. The Ambassador's self-help fund in South Africa has been particularly effective in supporting small-scale projects at the community level, some 37 projects costing $275,000 this year.

In another area, we have funded some half million dollars of drought relief assistance by nongovernmental groups, while stressing that South Africans themselves should carry the bulk of this responsibility.

Madam Chairman, these efforts lack drama, but they are the necessary building blocks of a constructive approach to change. When viewed in conjunction with the far larger efforts of Sullivan signatory companies and a host of U.S.-based foundations, universi-

ties, and unions, they make clear what we stand for in South Africa.

More could be done, and we stand ready to work with Congress in defining additional areas of constructive activity. Black South Africans who seek to improve their quality and standard of life, their bargaining power, their access to equal opportunity, and their capacity to participate as equals in all aspects of South African life are eager for support in a wide range of fields. These include health care, fair employment practices, and labor relations, education, legal services, and housing.

While the issue of political rights remains of paramount importance, these areas of expanded opportunity are also high on the list of black priorities. We will not ignore them.

Finally, Madam Chairman, I would be remiss in not saying a brief word about our regional efforts and accomplishments in southern Africa. Today, after 3 years of active diplomacy with all regional states concerned and our allies, we are closer to the threshold of Namibian independence than ever before. The underbrush has been cleared away.

Though negotiations are at a sensitive stage, we have reason to believe that we may be close to the fundamental political decisions we have all been seeking on implementing Resolution 435 and an agreement on the Cuban troop issue in Angola. We have identified the basis for a settlement and are committed to succeed.

On a broader regional basis, the level of cross-border violence in southern Africa is sharply reduced. Despite fundamental political differences, neighbors are increasingly sensitive to the responsiblities of coexistence. Contact and communication are on the increase. The U.S. role is one of a catalyst. Where that role is welcomed by both sides, we will play it.

Let me make clear, however, that we are not party to any effort to impose a standard formula on relations between South Africa and its neighbors. Each relationship is a distinct one and stands on its own merits. The dramatic example of Mozambique and South Africa concluding a formal political agreement met the needs of those two parties. Coexistence can take many forms.

What we do support, however, is a regional climate of dialog that gives negotiation and peaceful change a chance. We can be proud that the doctrines of guerrilla violence and the garrison state have been set aside, at least for now, as the parties explore other roads. We wish them all well.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

[Mr. Crocker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHESTER A. CROCKER

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to express clearly and unambiguously U.S. policy toward South Africa, its relationship to our regional strategy of constructive engagement in southern Africa, and our view of recent events in that region. Let us be frank at the outset by recognizing that the development of a policy that adquately reflects our moral principles, our interests as a great power, and the realities of influence and power in that distant region is one of the thorniest issues in U.S. foreign policy.

The dilemma is not that our principles and our interests are in conflict. They are not: U.S. values and interests can only be served to the degree that there is a strengthened framework of regional security in southern Africa and a sustained process of peaceful change in South Africa. The quest for security and the impera-

tive of change are dependent on one another. The challenge for U.S. policy is to define in an operational sense how we are to pursue these goals. This means that we must understand the extent of and limits on U.S. influence, and then use that influence in a sustained and coherent manner. This Administration has been doing precisely that for the past 3½ years. There have been substantial accomplishments, but a great deal remains to be done. Our country can be proud of its record in defining an agenda of negotiated change and regional security in southern Africa. But, first, that record must be clearly understood.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Recent events in South Africa serve to underscore our strong moral and political convictions about a system based on legally entrenched racism. As Americans, proud of our multiracial democracy, we are offended by dramatic television footage showing police action to contain the explosion of black anger in the "townships" of the Transvaal, and by headlines about a wave of detentions of opponents of the new constitution and sweeping bans on political meetings. Such actions touch a sensitive nerve in the American body politic. They threaten democratic values that we espouse as a nation and that we believe must be reflected in our foreign policy. It was only proper that our Government was the first to voice its concern publicly at these events as well as in diplomatic channels.

Similarly, we Americans are united in opposition to laws and practices in South Africa or anywhere else that offend basic concepts of due process and constitutional government. The theory of apartheid is rooted in the concept of ethnicity and ethnic separation. In practice, apartheid translates as a system based on race as the organizing principle of politics and government. Any system that ascribes or denies political rights on this basis—including the right of citizenship itself—is bound to be termed, as President Reagan has said, "repugnant."

It should be clear, then, what it is we are opposed to. Our goal is equally clear: as President Reagan stated in his address to the U.S. General Assembly this week, "the United States considers it a moral imperative that South Africa's racial policies evolve peacefully but decisively toward a system compatible with basic norms of justice, liberty and human dignity." As we have repeatedly stated since the outset of this Administration, we seek constructive change away from apartheid and toward a system based on the consent of the governed. This objective, too, reflects a broad national consensus. Americans reject instinctively scenarios that would have us instigate revolutionary violence and racial strife in that country with all their disastrous consequences in terms of misery and bloodshed for South Africans, their devastating results for Southern Africa and their risks of external intervention. No serious critic of our policy dares publicly to call for the apocalypse. Our goals—those of the American people—can only be reached through a sustained process of peaceful, evolutionary change. We remain opposed to the resort to violence from whatever quarter; the fruits of political violence in the world today are bitter reminders of what terrorism and counter-terrorism can mean.

THE CONTEXT FOR U.S. POLICY

The real issue, then, is not whether apartheid is good or bad, but rather what is the best means of encouraging constructive change in that country. Let us start by recognizing that indignation and strong convictions do not constitute a foreign policy. The issue is how to translate those convictions into results. While we have and we will speak out publicly to make our views known, public confrontation and rhetorical exchanges are not the main avenue for effective policy. The path of rhetoric and preaching has failed in the past, as its practitioners came to realize, and it is no more likely to be successful now. Ultimately, a great power will be measured by its results.

Similarly, we have not relied on bluster, threats or the actual implementation of new punitive measures toward South Africa. All evidence suggests that U.S. influence for change is unlikely to be increased by "pinpricks" such as restrictions on Krugerrand sales or on landing rights for South African Airways. Such moves are more likely to become a show of impotence and to erode our influence with those we seek to persuade. Our Administration remains totally opposed to the concept of disinvestment or trade and investment sanctions more broadly. We fail to see how waging economic warfare against the government and people of South Africa can advance our goals or serve the interests of either the American people or the citizens of all races in South Africa. Not only would such moves offer a fire sale of U.S. assets to foreign interests, damage our commercial credibility and restrict our access to an important market; in some proposals at city and state level they raise serious

constitutional issues. More important, if adopted, they could sabotage desperately needed economic opportunity for the black majority, remove the positive force for change represented by the Sullivan signatory companies, and produce disastrous consequences for those African states neighboring South Africa. Not surprisingly, an authoritative survey by a distinguished sociologist, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, reports that 75 percent of black factory workers oppose U.S. disinvestment. There is an Orwellion perversity in proposing such measures in the name of liberal and humanitarian goals.

The starting point in this Administration's approach to South Africa and southern Africa was to recognize the nature of U.S. influence in a regional context and to identify those constructive things we can do to advance our goals. We are one element in a complex regional equation. Our approach is to engage ourselves positively, to add our weight in support of Americans values, to back ideas, institutions and groups that can add to a dynamic for change, to propose alternatives, to open doors and build bridges—not the reverse.

In the South African context, much of our influence derives, we believe from the self-image of the South African leadership and the white minority generally as part of the West as well as of Africa, struggling to preserve its identity, to maintain its security and to avoid international isolation. Such attitudes for much of the post World War II period were accompanied by complacency interrupted by sudden shocks as occurred with the Portuguese revolution, the spread of decolonization to Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and the Soweto riots of 1976. Gradually in the last decade complacency gave way to a siege mentality, heightened by internal outbursts of black anger and alienation, by an increase in cross border guerrilla violence, by the projection of Soviet-Cuban military power into the region and by increasingly strident Western criticism of the South African system. Digging in its heels, the Afrikaner establishment which has ruled the country since 1948 developed an elaborate vision of itself as a regional superpower prepared to go it alone if necessary, to hang onto Namibia, and bring maximum pressure to bear on neighbors which are the host for guerrilla movements. The siege mentality included, at the time President Reagan took office, a determination above all to maintain Afrikaner ethnic unity inside the National Party and a highly abstract commitment to domestic reform imposed unilaterally from above.

A central element of U.S. policy for the past 3 years has been to address both the complacency and the siege mentality I have described, and to encourage the emergence of a more favorable climate for change. Repeatedly, we have emphasized the imperative of basic change while making clear that we recognize that such change entails a process, not merely a single decision. In our dialogue with South Africans of all races we have made clear our view that meaningful change is an urgent matter. At the same time we have stressed that such change can only flow from consultation and negotiation within South Africa and among all South Africans. We do not seek to impose an American blueprint. Recognizing that the cult of Afrikaner unity was hostile to serious reform, we moderated our public rhetoric in an effort to persuade the government there to respond to the realities of the South African situation itself.

This is not the place to recount in detail the sustained diplomatic efforts we have undertaken in southern Africa to reverse the escalating cycle of violence that risked engulfing the region in the early 1980's. But that effect—to obtain an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia on the basis of UNSCR Resolution 435, to reduce cross-border violence in both directions between South Africa and its neighbors, and to encourage a regional climate of detente and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the area—has been part and parcel of our South African policy. Our message to the South Africans has been to stress the benefits of cooperation and negotiation within an agenda we have put forward to all governments in the region. At the same time we have spelled out the costs and risks of failure, in terms of South African interests and our bilateral relationship. We believe the effort to define and build upon areas of common interest and mutual benefit throughout southern Africa is far preferable to simply accepting the drift toward polarization and violence. We strongly doubt that serious internal reform in South Africa is likely in a climate of constant fighting with adversaries along its borders. We know with assurance that U.S. regional interests and those of our allies are best served by a regional climate of greater stability, enhanced economic growth, and reduced openings for external intervention.

Today, 3 years later, we believe there is clear evidence of progress toward a more favorable climate for change. Today, the state of relations between the United States and South Africa matters very much to the South African leadership; the closeness or distance in that relationship depends heavily on internal change, evi-

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dence of momentum, and progress toward regional security. Our conscious effort to relax the siege mentality no doubt played a part in enabling then Prime Minister (now State President), P. W. Botha, to take the bold decision to put forward constitutional proposals which cost the National Party one-third of its core Afrikaner constituency and gained it new white voters beyond Afrikaner ranks.

Debate has raged over the question of South Africa's new constitution, endorsed by two-thirds of the white electorate in November 1983. It is an irony that the turmoil of the past days and weeks and the repression used to suppress it should have coincided with the introduction of a constitution which, to a limited extent, offers opportunities for wider political participation. Even this slight expansion of political rights to so-called "coloreds" and Asians has been seen by some whites as a threat and the "thin edge of the wedge." The fact that the new constitution made no provision for the inclusion of the 73 percent of the South African population who are black was bound to reinforce black bitterness. This Administration has been consistent in pointing out this fundamental flaw in the new constitution and our opposition to the attempt to "denationalize" blacks by declaring them citizens of the so-called homelands. Nevertheless, it would be premature to dismiss the new willingness of the whites to support the concept of reform or the potential of the new constitution for stimulating future change. The very exclusion of blacks ironically has forced the future political role of blacks on top of the public agenda. State President Botha indicated as much in his inaugural address. The departure from "whites only" politics may well prove to have a substantial effect on those who govern South Africa. The very fact that participation in the "colored" and Asian elections was so slow will add further impetus to existing pressure on newly elected members of the "colored" and Asian chambers to fight for change. We do not believe the debate over whether this new constitution represents a step forward can only be resolved by future historians. For our part, we believe that, whatever the intentions of its authors, it is an irreversible step. Its effect—precisely because of widespread boycotts—will be to accelerate the reappraisal of future options among whites and to further erode complacency.

We remain confident that there is a new dynamic at work in South Africa, driven by socio-economic and political requirements. This is by no means contradicted by the unrest and rioting of the past weeks. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out, this is a phenomenon that historically tends to occur precisely when rigid old patterns are beginning to break up. We are urging the South African Government to recognize that repression provides no lasting answer to this problem. We hope that the government will recognize that it is in its own interest to release those recently detained quickly, or, at the very least to charge those it has decided to put on trial without delay, so that they have a chance to defend themselves in a court of law. We have taken note that State President Botha himself, in his inaugural address, has stressed that the new system requires dialogue, not only among whites, "coloreds" and Asians, but also with blacks. The burden now is on the government to recognize and invite valid black interlocutors to the table. This is a process we encourage, even if we have no direct role in it, and do not presume to come up with prescriptive formulas.

A second feature of our efforts to back change is our quiet diplomacy on behalf of specific improvements and concrete problems of human and civil rights. By definition, one cannot discuss publicly the content of specific efforts. Nonetheless, while we recognize that the major impetus for change must come from within South Africa itself, we have actively concerned ourselves on several fronts to seek concrete improvements: our interest in such issues as detentions and bannings (until recently, dramatically reduced), urban residency rights for blacks, forced removals of settled black communities, and the issuance of travel documents and visas have been widely recognized in South Africa's human rights community—in sharp contrast to the distant critics who may afford the luxury of dismissing such matters as "mere amelioration" of the current system. We will remain engaged in such endeavors as we are certain the Congress and the American people would wish us to be.

A third element of our approach has been to provide concrete, tangible support of those groups, institutions and processes which are essential to change in South Africa. Through deepened contact with those who are on apartheid's receiving end and who seek the tools to promote peaceful black advancement, we have defined a series of assistance programs of which Americans can be proud. I would like to emphasize as well that we have done so in close cooperation with the Congress which has taken important initiatives to expand our efforts and establish new programs to assist apartheid's victims.

The Congress, most recently in response to your lead, Madame Chairman, and that of your colleague Senator Percy, has vitally contributed to enhanced opportuni-

ty for black South Africans. The humanitarian development monies under legislation which you sponsored this year have gone to assist 60 projects with a total of $500,000. These projects range from assistance to education in particularly deprived areas, to the provision of law libraries to legal centers in urban areas which assist blacks to understand their options under the law. Building from suggestions of Congressman Solarz during the previous Administration, we have gone foward to help educate black South Africans in a program that is a model of cooperation between the government and private sectors. A total of about $7.5 million, over half from the Federal Government, has brought about 350 black South Africans to the United States for advanced study. At this point about 50 have returned to use their skills in South Africa.

We are currently seeking to expand educational assistance by instituting a program of scholarship support for university level study within South Africa. If current obstacles can be overcome in consultation with Congress, we should be able to put 70 young people into a 5-year university at a cost of $3 millon. Nearly $6 million has been committed in support of programs of improving basic black educational skills, entreprenural training and the training and support of black trade unionists. The Ambassador's self-help fund has been particularly effective in supporting small scale projects at the community level—some 37 projects costing $275,000 this year. In another area we have funded some $500,000 of drought relief assistance via non-governmental groups—half in the form of 3-to-1 matching grants—while stressing that South Africans themselves should carry the bulk of this responsibility.

These efforts lack drama but they are the necessary building blocks of a constructive approach to change. When viewed in conjunction with the far larger efforts of Sullivan signatory companies and a host of U.S.-based foundations, universities, unions and other non-governmental organizations, they make clear what we stand for in South Africa. More could be done and we stand ready to work with Congress in defining additional areas of constructive activity. Black South Africans who seek to improve their quality and standard of life, their bargaining power, their access to equal opportunity and their capacity to participate as equals in all aspects of South African life are eager for support in a wide range of fields. These include health care, fair employment practices and labor relations, education, legal services and housing. While the issue of political rights remains of paramount importance, these areas of expanded opportunity are also high on the list of black priorities. We will not ignore them.

REGIONAL CONCLUSION

Finally, Madame Chairman, I would be remiss in not saying a brief word about our regional efforts and accomplishments in southern Africa. Today, after 3 years of active diplomacy with all regional states concerned and our allies we are closer to the threshhold of Namibian independence than ever before. The underbrush has been cleared away. Though negotiations are at a sensitive stage, we have reason to believe we may be close to the fundamental political decisions on implementing Resolution 435 and an agreement on the Cuban troop issue in Angola. We have identified the basis for a settlement and are committed to succeed. On a broader regional basis, the level of cross border violence in southern Africa is sharply reduced. Despite fundamental political differences, neighbors are increasingly sensitive to the responsibilities of coexistence. Contact and communication are on the increase. The U.S. role is one of a catalyst. Where that role is welcomed by both sides we will play it. Let me make clear, however, that we are not party to any effort to impose a standard formula on relations between South Africa and its neighbors. Each relationship is distinct and stands on its own merits. The dramatic example of Mozambique and South Africa concluding a formal political agreement met the needs of those two parties. Coexistence can take many forms. What we do support, however, is a regional climate of dialogue that gives negotiation and peaceful change a chance. We can be proud that the doctrines of guerrilla violence and the garrison state have been set aside—at least for now—as the parties explore other roads. We wish them all well.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much, Dr. Crocker. We appreciate your very thoughtful review of policy at this point.

I think, as you know, I have certainly been one who has supported the concept of constructive engagement. I believe that is what diplomacy is all about. But to be successful, as I have said, it has to be a two-way street. This is one of the things that we wish to ex-

plore today in this hearing: just exactly how successfully it is working as a two-way street.

I would agree with you when you said public confrontation and rhetorical exchanges are not effective policy. I think that is true. But one of the comments I constantly hear from black South Africans I meet is, do you really understand? We are not hearing anything from you that would indicate that you do understand the concerns we have. While we realize that rhetoric is not the answer—during the Carter administration we saw no concrete results, but at least we felt as if we were hearing something that gave us some hope.

I wonder if you feel we have gotten the message out as strongly and as successfully as we could, as far as the assistance we are trying to give through the scholarship programs, the humanitarian grants, through efforts to make some change?

I would like to ask specifically in regard to the increased detentions that you mentioned, what impact has our policy in the last 4 years had on South Africa's laws and the regulations concerning detentions and arbitrary arrests?

What exactly have we said regarding the recent escalation?

Mr. CROCKER. Madam Chairman, your comments about the issue of public versus private diplomacy are very much in our minds at all times. We would like to do better at communication. It is one of the most challenging aspects of the conduct of a policy which has so many different audiences.

Having said that, I think the record of our speaking out publicly as well as in diplomatic channels about the kinds of things that we feel most strongly about, repressive measures, lack of due process, lack of opportunity for peaceful political expression in some cases, these are the sorts of things that we cannot afford to be ambiguous about, and I do not think we are.

We have made abundantly clear in the context of the recent events to which you made reference that we cannot see what possible purpose is served by repressive measures at a time when opinion is being tested, and people are running for office under a new constitution.

So, I think our position on those kinds of issues is becoming better known, but I will be the first to say that we have a way to go.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you think that the South African Government feels freer to go ahead and pursue their own policy without taking into account any of our objections which I know have been expressed, to forced removals to settle black "homelands" or communities?

Is there anything that you believe after the last 4 years of efforts to open up avenues of communication that has given them and their own side a freer hand to do really what then they would wish to do?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I believe that there are specific kinds of results that one can point to, but I think it is very risky for us in effect to take credit or to be seen as taking credit for specific accomplishments.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, maybe this is what we need to do.

Mr. CROCKER. I understand, and it is one of our dilemmas. We are a factor in this situation. We obviously are not the only factor or even the most important factor. What we have sought to do is not to let people off the hook or to give them a free hand to do whatever they want to do, but rather to avoid a situation in which we become what they are reacting to rather than having them react to the reality inside the country.

Events of recent weeks in South Africa do give the Government of South Africa a great deal to think about. We would rather they think about that than what is said at the noon briefing at the Department of State every day. At the same time, we have spoken out, and I am sure you have noticed that we have spoken out pretty clearly, but the focus must be on looking at the problem and dealing with the problem which is in South Africa.

We have not sought in any sense to give people a free hand. We have sought to reduce the situation that previously existed where people were reacting to us and, in effect, used our position to unify their ranks. We believe it hampered change.

As for specific areas of accomplishment, the record in terms of the numbers of detentions and bannings have been dramatically down, until these recent events. We don't have precise figures in the current context; reports vary. But until the elections in late August, we saw a clear downward trend in detentions and bannings.

I do not think we should say that that is our achievement, but we are associated with it, at least in terms of history. The fact that, as I indicated in my testimony, the Afrikaner ranks have been opened up to more debate about the future, that the prime minister felt able to take this limited step forward, inadequate though it is, is something which I think is significant, and we should recognize that a dynamic is under way.

There are other more concrete areas that one should look at. What have been the results in terms of expansion of urban residency rights for blacks in South Africa? What has been the government's response to criticism not just from us but from many other people around the world about forced removals?

I think there is a pattern here, and we do not feel that our record is without accomplishment, as I have indicated.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I did not mean to imply that we were giving them a free hand, but that the perception might exist that they have a freer hand, that they believe that the South African Government has a freer hand without any fear of criticism.

I think that so often perception, unfortunately, gets very much involved with substance in policy and we must deal with perceptions. As you say, it is a two-edged sword, but if we are faulted when things go wrong, perhaps we should be a little bolder in stepping forward and taking credit when something goes right.

I think that we may have reached a point, where I would suggest to you, Secretary Crocker, that we may have to find something that can be a symbol of our caring, just as much as we are working and have tried to work, I think, very constructively over the 4 years to shape a policy that is going to prove in the long run to be a very substantive one.

I can think of several things that we perhaps should put forward as even a gesture, if you will, of something that we would view as an important symbol that not only is change necessary in South Africa, but that we care. I will explore that further as the questioning proceeds.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you.

In the article you wrote for Foreign Affairs that appeared the winter before the administration took office, you said,

> The many changes occurring today in South Africa are inherently ambiguous. Nonetheless, it should be possible at least to agree that black politics are characterized by the increasingly competent experimentation with various strategies for challenging white control.

This is the part I am getting to:

> While white politics are demonstrating a degree of fluidity and pragmatism, it is without precedent in the past generation.

You also stated,

> The modernizers who are taking over Afrikaner nationalist politics, unlike Ruwood, do not have an ideological blueprint. They have a set of attitudes, pragmatic, flexible, determined, and the concept of strategy defined as a continuing process of matching means and ends.

As I read your statement, the implication is that things were horrible 4 years ago, that there was no movement, and yet your writings 4 years ago suggested that evolution toward pragmatism had already taken place.

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I think it is a fair question. What I would like to stress is that we would not have undertaken a strategy of the kind we have undertaken if we felt that it was a hopeless case or a lost cause. If we felt the future had been written in South Africa, we would not be trying to do this, because it would be a lost cause by definition.

Clearly, there was evidence of change in December 1980, or whenever Foreign Affairs had the misfortune to publish my article, and there were signs of ferment at that time. What was not there was a political decision that could be sold and could be marketed by the top leadership and than ran the risk of having off one-third of the Afrikaner voters of the National Party, after more than 30 years of Afrikaner unity being the No. 1 priority of that party's politics.

That is a different order of magnitude from having an active ferment and an active debate and having some pragmatic people talking a lot. Before I wrote that article I had just spent some 6 months in South Africa, in which I recall endless conversations, but that is what we are talking about, conversations, not action.

Senator TSONGAS. Is that what we are talking about today?

Mr. CROCKER. I missed your question, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS. You had a lot of conversations over these 4 years. The question is, what actions have resulted? Let me quote you again, if I might.

You gave a speech in Kansas last year in which you said, "We now have in place virtually all the elements for the implementation of Resolution 435 and the transition to Namibian independence."

Well, I have given speeches in Kansas, too, that have come back to haunt me. [Laughter.]

But you seemed to be very optimistic a year ago that everything was virtually in place. Has something fallen out of place since your return from Kansas?

Senator KASSEBAUM. I hope not.

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, your question underscores the risks inherent in any effort to be responsive to questions about the prospects for success. I think it is fair to say that in this business we are all constantly aware of the many obstacles that we face. We have to be optimists. It is part of our trade, I think.

But the words that I have used in this testimony today are based on the facts as we see them. A year ago, it was fair to say that all the elements were in place as far as Resolution 435 was concerned, and South Africa's position had been made clear. On the other hand there had not been any signficant evolution in terms of unblocking the situation and our negotiations with the Angolans.

That has changed very substantially in the period since then. We have addressed directly two of the most important Angolan concerns that were inhibiting any movement on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal, one of them being the utter lack of respect at that time for its own sovereignty and boundaries by South Africa and the other being the presence in the country of large numbers of South African forces in an area of 25,000 square miles of occupied southern Angola.

A lot has changed since then, but I am not going to offer you rosy timeframes this afternoon about the Namibia settlement process except to say that as I have said in my testimony, we think there are some positive signs.

Senator TSONGAS. I would have no problem with that answer were it given 3 years ago or 2 years ago. Anybody who has been a fan of the New England Patriots gets used to the notion of next year there will be progress. [Laughter.]

But there comes a point where fans stop coming to the games, and season ticket sales fall, and so forth. I would suggest that season ticket sales at the Namibia games would probably fall off dramatically. I mean, there does come a point at which one has to produce as opposed to making optimistic statements.

Right now the President is what, 22 points ahead in the polls? Something like that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I do not know, but it keeps growing.

Senator TSONGAS. So one could, I suppose, legitimately, from your perspective, assume that there may be more time to carry this up, but what would you do if the polls were reversed tomorrow, and your role in history would be determined by what happened in these 4 years, and you were talking to an historian who said, what have you done on Namibia? What would your response be?

Mr. CROCKER. Well, I think I would say that we have approached the Namibia issue in a regional context, and that we have a proud record of accomplishment in southern Africa as a whole. We think that above all what we have done is to try to define an agenda that relates regional security to peaceful change.

We have defined an agenda which I think without arrogance one can say is the agenda within which all parties, and I mean all par-

ties, are operating. We have seized the initiative. Obviously, if your scenario were to play itself out, we would have very few weeks left to bring off some major accomplishments, but we would do our best.

Senator TSONGAS. I have sometimes tried to put myself in the position of being a black South African, and I had some occasion to have those feelings when I was there in 1980. But if I were a black South African, what would compel me to believe in peaceful change? What would give me hope that evolution is possible? What would convince me not to take up arms the way they did at Lexington and Concord over 200 years ago?

Mr. CROCKER. I do not think it would be appropriate for me to sit here, Senator, and say that black South Africans should or do look to the future with a bullish sense of optimism on this question. I think they, as are white South Africans, are very preoccupied by the question, is evolution possible? Is the future openended? Or has history been written already?

There is a natural human instinct to want to believe that you can influence events. In that regard, having opportunity is an awfully important part of the equation. There are more opportunities for black South Africans to advance themselves in that country than existed a while ago. I am not saying that it is our doing, but it is a fact.

In the field of trade union activity, perhaps the most dramatic example recently is that of the first legal strike by blacks that was successfully negotiated and resolved, albeit with tragic side effects in terms of the loss of life at several mines, but blacks bargained and got a very substantial advance in terms of salary.

This, one hopes, is a beginning and not the end. There are other fields that one could point to in terms of education and so forth. The point I am making is, if there are avenues, if there are outlets, if there is a chance for people to grow and to gain in bargaining power in the process, I think they would be more likely to look to the future as openended.

Senator TSONGAS. I want to pursue this. But I was trying to talk about within one's lifetime, because that would be their perspective, freedom within one's lifetime.

I see that my time is up, but I will come back on the next round.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I will not take very long. My questions would be along the lines of those of Senator Tsongas, who has a great deal of experience, as does the chairwoman, in this area.

Since we are quoting speeches—there was a wonderful old southern Senator at one time who said it is an awful lot easier to explain votes than it is speeches when you go back over the years. [Laughter.]

I hear quite often from South African delegations who meet with us periodically, and over and over again we have heard it, and you have expressed it again in your testimony this afternoon, that the kinds of efforts that have been raised by many in this country regarding sanctions or our public condemnation of South African policy or pressure of that kind, that it is self-defeating, that it con-

tributes less toward bringing about some form of reconciliation than some would otherwise think.

And yet I have noticed over the past several years that South Africa has not been reluctant to engage in the threat of sanctions or direct military involvement with regard to its neighbors, in order to pressure them to perform or to meet certain criteria or standards.

It seems to me that there is a contradiction when they want us not to do anything in a public sense through the administration, and yet they engage in it directly themselves. How do they respond to that when you raise that with them?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I believe that is a fair question. I do not believe, however, that we have ever said that we do not believe in saying anything in public. What we have said is that we do not think ritualistic public condemnation of all the things that one might identify to condemn on a regular basis should be the primary avenue of our policy, if we have other avenues available.

But we have spoken out. We have made some of our convictions as crystal clear as they could possibly be. We will continue to do that. I think it would be inappropriate for us to try in any way to defend a South African policy of public pressure against South Africa's neighbors. We do not endorse, orchestrate, or invent every decision the South African Government makes. While there are sometimes impressions created to the contrary in this country, a lot of things are done by that government that we would just as soon they had not done.

If South Africa's diplomacy in the region is to be effective, it would not be, I would argue, primarily through public threats and intimidation.

Senator DODD. Well, nonetheless, they seem to engage in it with a rather heavy hand, and yet over and over again it is suggested to the Congress or others that to engage in similar behavior would be highly detrimental.

Your testimony, you quote a poll that was conducted. I forget who you cite as the author of that survey. It was a survey among blacks in South Africa with regard to self-determination—there it is. Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer reports that 75 percent of the black factory workers oppose U.S. disinvestment. And yet we hear over and over again that at least among a substantial percentage of the black population in South Africa, there is the sense that we, that is, the United States is no longer really on their side with regard to the issue of apartheid.

One, how accurate and how much are we relying on a survey such as that? Was the question phrased simply—are you opposed to U.S. investment? Or was the question worded in such a way as to indicate the proposed sanctions would be called for as a way of trying to induce South Africa to drop its apartheid policies? And what was the response of the black working population with regard to that question? Was that the simple question right there?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we would be most pleased to make a copy of this study available. There were many questions asked, and they were designed to probe all aspects of attitudes toward change, toward outside pressures, different kinds of outside pressures, toward a tradeoff between political aspirations and the mainte-

nance of jobs, attitudes toward capitalism and the like. A long list of questions were asked.

Senator DODD. I would like to see that. The implication of the testimony here at least implicitly is, while I do not think you say it throughout, but it is that 75 percent of the black factory workers oppose U.S. disinvestment.

At least it suggests somehow that the majority of the black population is pretty much satisfied with the way things are, and they do not want the United States meddling in their affairs.

You could even go a step further and suggest somehow that they are satisfied with the status quo.

Mr. CROCKER. That is not at all the conclusion that we would draw from it. The study makes very clear that there is profound dissatisfaction with the status quo, and there is also a profound conviction that people do not want to lose their jobs and their chances for advancement and training, and do not want to see their factories affected in ways that could result from a measure such as disinvestment.

So, I think it is a much more sophisticated judgment that the respondents of the survey were asked to make. There is no question that this is anything but a whitewash of the status quo, and the conductor of the survey I think has a fair amount of credibility in handling such issues.

Senator DODD. Last, in response to Senator Tsongas' question about if you were a black living in South Africa, how would you feel? What in your conversations with political leaders within the black community in South Africa is their attitude toward the administration's policies over the last 3 years?

How do they perceive the United States? Do they perceive us as being on their side in the sense of trying to do something in a very constructive and serious way, or do they see this administration as having been rather lax in their pursuance of trying to do more?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we have been trying for the past 3½ years to define and communicate an approach to an enormously complicated issue in the region. I think it is fair to say that while you cannot generalize, and it would be arrogant for me to try to speak for black South African leaders, that there are questions, that in some quarters there is hope, in some quarters there are misgivings.

I do not know if I would really want to characterize a kind of blanket assessment. I suspect, though, that as our predecessors were judged by results, so we will be. I also suspect that as the Senator from Massachusetts indicated, we may need 4 more years in order to persuade a lot more people.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would just like to suggest, Senator Tsongas, that maybe we should compare the situation to the Chicago Cubs rather than the New England Patriots, because if you wait long enough, success prevails.

Senator DODD. Thirty-nine years is a long time. [Laughter.]

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, now, I was hoping you were not going to count. [Laughter.]

I would like to ask a question in followup a little bit to the regional efforts. This is a very important equation in the whole policy regarding South Africa.

I have been troubled about South Africa's relationship to Botswana, which has been a country that has been fairly open, free, and economically successful and has come under a great deal of pressure from South Africa to sign a nonaggression pact, which they have not wanted to do.

They have had a good relationship with South Africa, and yet there is a great deal of force on the part of the South Africans to get this pact signed.

Have we done anything, and are we willing to assist Botswana in standing up to the pressure of South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, we are both willing and we have done so, to communicate our feelings that Botswana and South Africa are the ones to decide what is the basis of their coexistence, and that an imposed arrangement is not going to be durable, and it is not something that we could support.

As you will recall, the President of Botswana visited here in May, and there were a number of things said both publicly and privately at that time to signal very clearly how we felt about that question.

We have a high regard for the standards of political decency and economic development in Botswana as well as for its conduct of its own regional affairs, and we have said so. It is not my impression that at this time the South African Government is seeking such a pact with Botswana, but perhaps that question should be put to them.

We do not believe that that is the case at this time.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Regarding Mozambique, am I not correct that part of the agreement with the pact signed with Mozambique was that there would not be any support for the ANC [African National Congress], and in fact efforts to remove the ANC as a presence from Mozambique would be part of the agreement as well as South Africa's not assisting the guerrillas?

What is the current state of affairs? I have understood that guerrilla activity has increased in Mozambique. Is this something that is happening all on its own? Has South Africa from any sort of assessment that you have been able to make been involved, and what is our role regarding the ANC in Mozambique or its operation anywhere outside South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, our impression is that both sides in that agreement have impressed each other with the level of their adherence to the commitments that they made.

Again, it is a little difficult for us to speak on behalf of two other governments, but we have been in the middle of this discussion for some time now, for over 2 years, seeking to encourage a process of dialogue, the solving of problems.

We feel confident that we would know if either government had major grievances to bring against the other. We do not see any pattern of violation that we can cite. It is true that violence in Mozambique continues. It may represent an effort on the part of the resistance to assert their place or some request for status, for a role.

But it is not our impression that the problems that may develop in implementing any agreement cannot be resolved and are not being resolved. We know that the two sides are talking to each other very regularly, bringing problems to the table, and talking them through.

As far as the question that you raised on the ANC situation is concerned, there have been a number of movements of ANC people out of Mozambique to other places. I do not know if that answers your question, Senator.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes, it does, in part, particularly because I have just wondered what sort of involvement there might be on the part of South Africa in the guerrilla activity in Mozambique, and I understand you to say that you feel that if there were any involvement, we would know. Is that correct?

Mr. CROCKER. That is correct.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Regarding Namibia, what is the current status of the Contact Group, and are they all part and parcel of all that is taking place today in the negotiations?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, the Contact Group was founded in order to negotiate independence for Namibia, and is a party in fact to some of the agreements related to Resolution 435 and its associated annexes. In that sense, the Contact Group continues to exist and to function. It would be a major loss if it did not because it is a party to an international agreement.

Having said that, the Contact Group members, apart from ourselves, have all made clear that we, the United States, are the ones involved in negotiation with the Angolan Government over the separate issue of Cuban troop withdrawal. And so the involvement of the Contact Group as such in that side of the equation is only random and informal. That is the way I would describe it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But as you said in your statement, the fundamental political decision would be the implementation of Resolution 435, and this is something that the Contact Group supports?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And we are still working strongly in that direction?

Mr. CROCKER. Yes, indeed.

Senator KASSEBAUM. One of my concerns has been, and I think you expressed it to the committee several years ago when you testified, that there is the danger of our getting bogged down on Namibia, and with it so much a focus of our policy, we put all of our eggs in one basket.

I think on the whole you have done a very good job of trying to keep all areas of our sub-Saharan African policy meshed together, but it has now been 4 years that Namibia has been at the center of our policy. Do you feel that there is a danger that we get bogged down? Are you cognizant of the need to move on, if indeed we need to take a thrust in a different direction?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, it is a fair question. I think we are engaged on many fronts, as you have said, some of which are less newsworthy, perhaps, less dramatic in the public eye than the events in southern Africa, which have a very high political and emotional content in this country and other countries.

I do not feel that that has caused us to neglect major opportunities or major problems. We have spent an enormous amount of our energy on some of the economic situations that Africa faces, and I think we have a proud record in that regard in terms of both our level of resources for African development, our level of emergency food, and so forth.

We have to remain engaged across a very broad front. We are not going to let what you are describing happen if we can possibly avoid it. If we concluded that the situation in southern Africa had broken down, that there was stalemate, and determined resistance to any further movement or progress, of course, we would have to reappraise it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Tsongas, do you have any further questions?

Senator TSONGAS. I was intrigued by the answer to Senator Dodd's question about contacts with blacks, whether they think we are for them or not. You said, there are some areas of support and some areas of concern, and that is true.

But if I lost an election 95 to 5, I could say I won some precincts and lost some others, which would be factually the case, but it would not tell the story. I think it is fair to say that at least 95 percent of the blacks in South Africa, unless my contacts are meaningless, feel that the United States is not supportive of their long-term endeavors.

When you went to South Africa, who were some of the black leaders that you met with?

Mr. CROCKER. I am not sure that it is wise for me to identify individuals that I meet with on trips who are not directly involved in government-to-government negotiations, Senator. I try to keep my contacts open both when I go there and when people come here with a wide range of key South Africans.

I do not sense some of the trends that I see occasionally referred to in the press that people are unwilling to meet with us, to talk with us, to hear our views, to give their views across the political spectrum in South Africa.

Senator TSONGAS. Bishop Tutu now has a policy of not meeting with U.S. officials. Is that the case, or not?

Mr. CROCKER. It is news to me. I met with him 2 days ago.

Senator TSONGAS. You met with him in South Africa?

Mr. CROCKER. Here.

Senator TSONGAS. I am referring to meeting him in South Africa.

Mr. CROCKER. I believe I met with him in South Africa, too, though I would have to check the record on that, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS. The black leaders that you met with in South Africa, are you relunctant to identify them?

Mr. CROCKER. I could provide you something for the record, if you like, Senator, on people that I have met with across the spectrum, both in this country and in South Africa.

Senator TSONGAS. I mean in South Africa.

Mr. CROCKER. If you like, I can do that, Senator. I think you will understand my point, however, which is that we are not seeking to put anybody on the spot.

Senator TSONGAS. But it is rather indicative that one in a public session would not say who one met with for fear they are going to be harmed.

Mr. CROCKER. It is indicative, Senator, of an atmosphere that involves a very high degree of polarization which is dangerous in South Africa. We are very conscious of it.

[Dr. Crocker provided the committee with a list of "black and other non-white leaders" in South Africa with whom he met either in the United States or South Africa during the 3 years 1982-84. He asked that the names not be included in this transcript. The names of the 11 Africans, 2 Asians, and 2 "coloured" individuals with whom he met are available to Members from the committee.]

Senator TSONGAS. Did you ever suggest to the President that he make a trip to Africa? He has been to a number of places, and never traveled to black Africa. Have you ever suggested that that might be helpful?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I have not specifically proposed such a trip. No, to answer your question.

Senator TSONGAS. But if you were an African, and saw the President going to this country and that country but never touching down in black Africa, what would you conclude from all of that?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I think this administration has the most active policy in Africa that any administration has had since World War II. The record of the President's own involvement with African visitors to this country in terms of people seen and time spent is also a very creditable one.

We are engaged in many areas.

Senator TSONGAS. What would you list as your three major accomplishments with all of this activity that you have described?

Mr. CROCKER. I would cite first the issues that we have been talking about this afternoon. I would cite second, and not necessarily in order of priority ranking, our success in defining an agenda for economic development and economic policy reform in Africa, which has produced the kind of consensus that we now see reflected in the World Bank Special Report on Africa, its third report, a report which in practice reads very much like many of our own briefing papers and the things we have been saying to African governments and other donor governments for the past 3 years.

We have, I think, succeeded in tough times in a budgetary sense in channeling resources to Africa. I think we have also made clear that we are prepared to support regional security in other parts of Africa, and to stand up where we are asked to against challenges such as that represented by Libya's involvement across borders in different regions of the continent.

Senator TSONGAS. Those would be your top three?

Mr. CROCKER. I am sure I can come up with some more if you would like me to continue, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS. If you knew 4 years ago that that would be your answer, would you have taken the job?

Mr. CROCKER. I would, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS. Ian Smith once said that black majority rule would come to Rhodesia over his dead body. As far as I know, he is still quite active, and it has come. It came because they had no choice.

The President's position vis-a-vis the Soviets in negotiations on arms control is that you toughen up first and then you talk. He used the same policy in Nicaragua. If you want to get the Nicaraguans to be reasonable, you support the Contras.

In the case of South Africa, it is the opposite, that you cannot pressure anybody if you want them to change. Is human nature different in South Africa than it is in Russia or Nicaragua?

Mr. CROCKER. I think to describe our policy toward South Africa as lacking in pressure is to miss a number of pretty basic elements of what that policy is as I have tried to describe it.

But I also think we should recognize the differences between a superpower and a regional power like South Africa and the differences in their systems and what they represent. It seems to me that one has to look at each situation on its own merits, and to equate our United States-South African diplomacy and our United States-Soviet diplomacy is to mix together apples and oranges.

Senator TSONGAS. What about Nicaragua? You cannot argue that Nicaragua is a larger regional power than South Africa.

Mr. CROCKER. Well, what is the question, Senator?

Senator TSONGAS. The question is, the way we are dealing with Nicaragua is through pressure. You pressure them by supporting the Contras. And the whole theory is that you do not deal with people unless you are perceived as having a strong hand.

In the case of South Africa, that is not the theory that is being pursued.

Mr. CROCKER. In the case of South Africa, we have brought very substantial diplomatic pressure to bear to indicate that we are deadly serious about achieving change in the pattern of regional violence that we see there.

Senator TSONGAS. And they laugh up their sleeve. How often has the President mentioned South Africa in the last 4 years? You quote his speeches. How many times has South Africa been an item that he has mentioned in a major speech?

Mr. CROCKER. I would have to check the record, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, it is not a lot. I mean, this is ridiculous. I would be embarrassed to get up and give this testimony. We are in bed with them. To all intents and purposes, we are doing nothing of any consequence, and what is going to happen, Mr. Secretary, is that the young black in South Africa is going to resort to violence, and that violence will eventually be Marxist.

And they are going to do it because they do not believe the administration is committed to change.

I happen to be a believer in your good intentions, which makes this very difficult. But if you look at results, the fact is, there have not been any, and the President has put South Africa at the bottom of the totem pole of his concerns. He is a nice guy. But what is happening in South Africa is not nice.

It is more than repugnant. If it is repugnant, you do something about it. I really regret that in the 4 years and the opportunity that was had, that nothing has happened. I think ultimately there is a moral responsibility to look back at one's stewardship and say, we made a difference, and the fact is, there has not been a difference.

And people are going to die. And I must say, if I were a young black in South Africa, and I had you come before me and explain all these marvelous trends in the right direction, I would not be dissuaded from violence, and that is where they are going, and we are sitting back and allowing it to happen, and I think it is a tragedy, because it is not going to affect us, but it will affect other people.

And it could have been another Ian Smith situation, where they were made to realize there was going to be change, you had better make it, or else, and the only resolution I see, the only hope that the blacks in South Africa have is what is taking place now in the grassroots, that you are getting communities around the country voting for disinvestment.

It is happening not only in some academic communities, but others, and I hope to be active next year in pursuing that, because I have given up, and I have spent far too long being quiet, and I regret that. I have real regrets about it in terms of my own moral perception of my role here.

But I just gave you too much time. I should have spoken out earlier. Hopefully I can make up for some of that next year.

You know, I hate to say it, but I like you. I really wish that was not the case. [Laughter.]

But I liked a lot of the managers of the Patriots and the Red Sox over the years, but it did not make a difference, and ultimately when we are talking about human lives, it is not whether people are good or well intentioned, it is what they produce that really counts. I regret having to say what I said, but it is what I feel.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would just like to say, Senator Tsongas, that I think all of us, including Secretary Crocker, share a great deal of frustration as we have worked with this whole area. Nothing about South Africa is easy.

We talk about disinvestment, which I do not support. I think it is one thing to kind of put out suggestions or a motivation for something that we believe will cause a change, which really in all honesty I cannot see it affecting any change except doing hurt to black South Africans.

Perhaps it is an example of a symbolic gesture, but it is one that causes more harm than good, and I think in our frustration in trying to suggest something that does make a difference we all end up lashing out in one way or another and wondering what we can do that will be successful.

I think while sometimes it is not that apparent, there are those things that are undertaken. I share with you the concern that you have, and I think it would be Dr. Crocker's, too, that there could be violence. We have seen violence, and we may have to do things that set an agenda of our own policy concerns rather than perhaps allowing the agenda to be set for us.

In that, though, it is not always easy to see results that we can list as A, B, C. One thing that I was going to suggest which is not just symbolic but it is certainly, I think, as far as the South African Government would address a deep concern and show that there is a willingness to be sensitive to those concerns and that would be the release of Nelson and Winnie Mandela.

Now, in many ways it is something deeply felt, and I know Senator Tsongas has spent a great deal of time assisting the Mandelas. It is a recognition of a sensitivity and a moral concept that I think would have some bearing in South Africa. It certainly would be something that we would wish to see happen, and I think while it would cause no enormous policy shift, it is an example that can be made to at least show that there is a willingness to recognize the deeply felt concerns regarding policy there.

Senator Dodd, do you have anything further?

Senator TSONGAS. May I just make one comment first?

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes.

Senator TSONGAS. You know, I recognize the difficulty of change. If you look at the civil rights movement of the United States, all of the marvelous white intentions did not really count for a heck of a lot until people like Rosa Parks said no and forced the issue.

I agree to some extent it does not make a difference which administration is here, but it is going to depend on the blacks in South Africa doing what Rosa Parks did, and that is to say no, no more, the time has come for change.

I would just hope that when that moment comes, as it inevitably will, when they look back on the United States role, it is one that we are not embarrassed about.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, Madam Chairman, Senator Tsongas has expressed a lot of my views. Mr. Secretary, as you know, some of us up here, when your nomination came up, strongly supported it over the objections of some others.

Senator TSONGAS. Who also will not be named for fear of reprisals. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. That is right. We would not want you to be hurt.

Over the last 3 or 4 years, and I suppose this is our fault to some degree, I have often pointed out in meetings with people who have asked questions about the conduct of foreign policy that even those who have disagreed with the administration, have not been charging forward on the question of South Africa.

Certainly we have in Latin America and on arms control issues and so forth, but I think it was rather significant that in the area of South Africa there was a strong desire to give you and the people around you a good opportunity to try to achieve some things.

The general feeling was that you were, and I think it still is that you are trying to make an effort, but I think you feel as well as we do that it is more than just a local and regional issue because it does say volumes about this country and our actions in other parts of the world.

While it is always difficult, given the specifics of various situations, to maintain any pure consistency of position, and we all know how difficult it is in the conduct of a human rights policy, and obviously South Africa is far more complicated than just a human rights policy.

But certainly central to it is the issue of human rights, and there is no absence of resolutions and amendments and legislation that

are offered, proposed, or suggested when we see the deprivation of human rights in other parts of the world.

And yet in this particular area it seems there has been and is an absence of any real focus of proper attention and criticism.

Strong sanctions have never been imposed. There has been a lot of talk about it, but we have not really had the kind of leveling of economic sanctions that has been suggested. It seems to me that we are running out of ammunition in this context, and our ability to have an influence on events seems rather shallow and hollow there.

I think what Senator Tsongas said is absolutely correct. It goes beyond just our ability to produce some results and some trends. My suspicions are that both within the black and the white community, not only in South Africa but elsewhere, where we have a strong interest and some very important reasons for being involved, we are seen as really rather ineffective in bringing about any kind of change at all.

It is one thing for a Member of Congress to get up and say something, or for a Dear Colleague letter to be written. I think all of us recognize the power and the influence when a President of the United States or a Secretary of State speaks out on an issue.

In this regard, it seems to us or to many people that during these last 3 or 4 years, despite your good intentions and efforts, this administration really has not produced any kind of awareness within the establishment in South Africa that the executive branch is really going to do a whole lot about the problem, but rather will just keep on buying time.

It seems to me that that is tantamount to defeat when you start talking about the long term and our interests. Now, I am not stating that there is any easy formula, but I do not think we are taken very seriously on this subject matter, that is, we, the United States, this administration.

I, for one, would like to see something more than what we have seen so far, or my fear is you will see the exact kind of situation Senator Tsongas has described. Then all of a sudden it will become a question of trying to provide aid and assistance and all sorts of other things even though the handwriting was on the wall not weeks or months but years ago.

So, I would hope that you would take this hearing and what was said here, even though there are only two or three of us here expressing our views, as representative of a lot more in the Congress. This administration has the unique opportunity to achieve some things in this regard that realistically a Democratic administration has had difficulty with.

I am not suggesting that they should be excused, but it seems to me that the Reagan administration has a very real opportunity to achieve significant progress in this regard. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Dr. Crocker.

Mr. CROCKER. Madam Chairman, a number of things have been said that I am tempted to try to reply to very briefly. I do not want to exhaust your time, and you have been very generous with time already.

It would be, I think, appropriate to respond to a couple of points, however. I appreciate the Senator's personal statement that he likes me. I like him, too. The Senator from Massachusetts. I think in fact that there is vastly more common ground in this discussion than may meet the eye, particularly as concerns the analysis of the situation.

Violence does happen and is happening in South Africa today. We fully agree with you that it will continue to happen, it will grow if there are no outlets provided and channels created and dialogs started and negotiations begun.

In fact, it is that threat, it is that pressure, that force which has been progressively growing, whether you look at it in terms of the power of organized labor or the power of consumers or simply the power of rioters. That is going to bring about change in South Africa.

We feel very strongly about that. I think we probably would agree with some of the analysis. I am troubled, though, at the implication that Senator Dodd made that we do not speak out.

I think if one were to travel in this region, one would find that our positions, our views, our public statements are page 1 in every country in southern Africa, that we are taken more seriously than we have ever been taken in southern Africa, and that in fact we have more credibility than we had a few years ago.

Obviously, some of the things we have tried to do have been ambitious, and there have been areas of controversy, but I think we do have credibility.

The final point I would make before stopping my remarks is this. I think we must return again to the question of context. The basic issue is, are we looking at a region and at a country where the situation is hopeless, where the situation is without evidence of change, without evidence of dynamics, and if so, what are the dynamics?

That is what I have tried to address in my testimony, and I have found this exchange useful.

Thank you very much.

Senator TSONGAS. I do not think anyone is arguing hopeless. I mean, I will probably go to a Patriots game some time this fall. There is always hope. But what you just said, your first rebuttal is very significant. You said that there are pressures from trade unionists, consumers, perhaps even rioters that provides the sense of movement.

That is exactly the case, but if you carry that out, that also says that if you want to increase that pressure—by definition you would want to—then riot—as long as there is quietude, people will do nothing. It is human nature. When there is pressure, in this case red violence, then there is the pressure for change.

Is that not what you said? I mean, you did not say it that way, but is that not the next logical extension of your first rebuttal?

Mr. CROCKER. Senator, I think the context of the recent violence, just to take that one case, the violence since late August should be looked at for what it was. It was a reaction to an election that many people had questions about, and a constitution that many people had questions about, and then that reaction, the boycott was repressed. There were other grievances as well, bread and butter

grievances, as you know, on educational issues and many other things.

I think we should tread very carefully before suggesting that people take to the streets in that country.

Senator TSONGAS. I am not suggesting that, but let us look at that situation. They have a constitution. This was going to be the great new way. Had there not been the boycott, had there not been the violence, would not the constitutional change have been viewed as successful, and they would have been on tap?

Has it not been the boycott by the Indians and the coloreds and the subsequent violence that has now called world attention to the flaws of that approach? I am not arguing for it. I am just trying to say that that is in fact what has happened.

Mr. CROCKER. I think there is no question but that the events in recent weeks have accelerated the process of thinking. No question. I think I am agreeing with you.

Senator TSONGAS. And what you are saying to the boycotters was, by boycotting you forced them to rethink—well, I hate to suggest that we may be in accord, but perhaps in that case we are.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much, Secretary Crocker. I do think it has been a useful exchange. We appreciate your thoughtful observation.

Mr. CROCKER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator KASSEBAUM. The next panel will be Ambassador Newsom and Dr. Karis.

[Pause.]

Senator KASSEBAUM. Ambassador Newsom, it is a pleasure to welcome you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador NEWSOM. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

I told Chet Crocker as he left that I had echoes of sitting in this same seat 10 years ago, perhaps saying some of the same things, having also been Assistant Secretary of State under a Republican administration.

I have a very brief statement. I have given you copies. I can read it if you wish.

Senator KASSEBAUM. The statement in its entirety will be included in the record, and if you would like to summarize, that will be just fine with us. We would appreciate it.

Ambassador NEWSOM. Thank you.

Very briefly, I need to stress that it has been 10 years since I relinquished the post of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and I went on to duties in other areas.

I have kept generally in touch with African issues, because once one is associated with a problem such as this, you do not forget it.

But I am aware, in appearing before the subcommittee, that my information and my perception of current policy is not as current as, perhaps, some of the other witnesses.

I also have a certain sympathy for Assistant Secretaries who have the burden and who have the knowledge which some of the rest of us may not have.

The points that I wanted to make are really four. I was associated with African policy through the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, the first part of the Nixon administration, and in every one, southern Africa and South Africa were critical questions.

There were basically, in every administration, four aspects of the problem of our relationship with southern Africa and South Africa.

First is the South African view of the U.S. position, because it was my impression and it is still my impression that South Africa attaches tremendous importance to the attitudes expressed by this country toward its internal situation as well as toward its external policies, and the signals that we give from this country are an important part of, I think, at least the psychological climate within which South Africa feels it can operate.

Second is the critical problem of our reaction to internal change in South Africa, which you have covered very extensively with Assistant Secretary Crocker. I would just like to point out that not only is the question whether we react to change but the question of how we react to change are extremely important ones which every administration has struggled with. The questions are whether positive statements welcoming partial developments encourage further development or merely suggest that we are prepared to accept change on South Africa's condition and South Africa's timetable, the question of whether criticism merely reinforces the South African view that progress is never likely to be sufficient for the international community, or whether it will be a spur to further reform, whether silence will be seen as acquiescence or disapproval.

It has always been my view, not only in our diplomacy with southern Africa, but in our diplomacy elsewhere that it is wrong to talk about quiet diplomacy versus open diplomacy as mutually exclusive options, that the time comes when quiet diplomacy needs to be supplemented by this Nation's speaking out on issues which it considers important, and that such a time comes periodically in southern Africa.

Third is the balance between our interests in black Africa and in South Africa, I mean, the rest of the continent. Clearly our credibility in the rest of the African continent is conditioned to some extent on the attitudes we adopt toward the situation in South Africa.

I say to some extent because I think our bilateral relations with each country are probably more important. I also have the impression that the reaction of the African countries to our policies in South Africa are less apparent and less vocal than they were during my time as Assistant Secretary, possibly because the African countries are turning more to their internal problems, and because there is less of an active structure of African unity than there was 10 years ago.

Finally, I think there is a balance of interests that we always need to pursue in this country. I think politically, and this is a matter that was debated extensively in the Carter administration,

we cannot resolve the Namibia question without appearing to do something about the Cuban forces in Angola.

But I am not certain that the kind of precise linkage which has been followed in this administration is either necessary or perhaps ultimately effective. To be fully acceptable, however, our policies also have to reflect the strong desire, I think, of the bulk of our citizens that we avoid identification with the policies of South Africa regionally as well as internally.

I have always believed that this could best be accomplished by restrictive official policies such as restrictions on military and intelligence contacts, export credits, which have been traditional over a number of administrations. The popular ideas of disinvestment and total diplomatic disengagement, while they might provide us with a certain amount of satisfaction, may be very difficult to realize, and possibly not ultimately effective in changing the situation.

So, with these few thoughts, I will leave it to the professor.

[Ambassador Newsom's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM

Madam Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this significant review of the relations of the United States with Africa.

It has been more than 10 years since I relinquished the post of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Although I have followed events in the continent from various vantage points since that time, I do not claim to be totally up-to-date on current events.

I come also following the testimony of the very respected current Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. In commenting upon the testimony of a sitting official, I am always acutely aware that such persons have a greater access to information and a broader perspective on current policy than those of us who are following it from the outside.

What I reflect, therefore, is a personal view conditioned by nearly 11 years of service relating to United States relations with the African continent.

While the United States has wide interests in Africa, the focus of many discussions of African policy in this country centers on southern Africa. This is natural, given the broad concern in this country and internationally over the continued existence of apartheid and of tensions among countries in that area. The concern has been heightened in recent years in the United States because of the geopolitical importance many attach to the region and the reflection of the East-West conflict in the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The United States has, through several administrations attempted to deal constructively with the tensions, in particular the issues of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and to prevent substantial Soviet gains in the region.

Every administration has believed it necessary to maintain some degree of relationship with South Africa. Where administrations have wished to emphasize that relationship, it has acquired a name, whether "communication," "dialogue," or "constructive engagement."

Each administration has also faced four kinds of problems in this relationship.

First, the South African view of the U.S. position toward it and toward its role in southern Africa. South Africans, isolated as they are, have been eager for international acceptance on their terms. When policies of the United States toward such matters as formal relationships with the South African military and intelligence officials or export credits have been restrictive, South Africa has been left in some doubt concerning the attitudes of this country and its possible responses to assertive South African policies in the region. When the policies have been more relaxed, South Africa may feel less constrained to pursue its interests as it sees fit. South Africa pays special attention to the signals it receives from the United States.

Second, the reaction of the United States to internal change in South Africa. This has obviously been a matter of concern to substantial portions of our own citizenry as well as to those of all races in South Africa. Each administration, at times when there have been substantial political developments in South Africa, has faced the dilemma. Will a positive statement on such a development further the course of con-

structive political change or merely suggest that we are prepared to accept change on South Africa's timetable. Will criticism merely reinforce the South African view that progress on their terms is never likely to be sufficient for the international community and harden the government's position or will it be a spur to further reform? Will silence be seen as acquiescense or disapproval?

Third, the balance between U.S. interests in black Africa and in South Africa. Clearly, our credibility in the bulk of African nations is conditioned to some extent on the attitudes we adopt toward the situation in southern Africa. I say "to some extent" because it was my impression that our bilateral relations with each country are the most important factor in how we are viewed. I have, also, the impression now that many African countries that were previously active in pressing us and other countries on this issue have now turned more to their internal problems and that there is less demonstrable African concern than 10 years ago. Nevertheless, our identification with progress toward an internationally acceptable solution to such issues as Namibia is important.

Fourth, the balance of interests in this country. I believe it is correct that broad American acceptance of our African policies today requires that we make a genuine effort to reduce the Cuban presence in Angola. I am not certain that the linkage with Namibia needs to be as direct, but I can understand the basis for the approach.

To be fully acceptable, however, U.S. policies must reflect in a credible way strong desires that also exist in this country to avoid identification with the policies of South Africa and, to the extent possible, exercise influence on internal change. I have always believed this could be best accomplished by restrictive official policies that gave credence to our professions of opposition to apartheid. I recognize the force of the disengagement and disinvestment approaches. They may be useful in dramatizing our distance from the South African Government; I have never been certain of either their feasibility in practice or of their ultimate impact on the situation in South Africa.

I should be happy to elaborate on these thoughts if the subcommittee has further questions.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

I think we will hear from Dr. Karis first, and then we will ask both of you some questions, if that is all right.

Dr. Karis.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS KARIS, GRADUATE SCHOOL, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, NY

Mr. KARIS. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

While I welcome very much the opportunity to make a few comments about South Africa at the end of the first 4 years of the policy of constructive engagement and perhaps the beginning of another 4 years, I want to say a bit apologetically that because of the very short notice, I do not have a prepared statement but I do have notes.

What I want to do is to touch upon many points, and I look forward to a chance to amplify them if you have time during the discussion period. For example, I hope somebody on the panel will ask me about Professor Schlemmer's study on black attitudes toward disinvestment.

The other night I met a South African judge who happens to be in the hearing room today, and I was describing this hearing to him. I thought there were going to be a couple of other panelists, and I said that I hope to be the kind of witness who is objective, judicious, balanced, nonpolemical, and he shot back, that is the worst kind.

I am here not as a political spokesman, but as someone who has been mainly concerned with South Africa for over 33 years. I was in the State Department for 8 years, first as a research officer and

then as a Foreign Service officer, serving in the political section of the American Embassy in 1957 to 1959.

South Africa has continued to be my main interest ever since. I have made many trips to South Africa or southern Africa, my most recent early last year, and perhaps I might mention, since one cannot cover as much as one would like to, that a recent article I have written in "Foreign Affairs" in the winter issue, which I would like to think of as a counterpart to Secretary Crocker's article of 3 years ago, dealt with black politics.

I am going to begin by making a few observations about what has been referred to as the rioting in recent weeks. I prefer to use the words "violent demonstrations."

According to official figures now, 56 people have died, and hundreds have been wounded. There was indeed provocation for the police, who replied with rubber bullets, teargas, and shotguns. It does seem to me just on the basis of press reports that there were quite a few instances of unrestrained action by the police, especially in using whips.

There were also 7 people killed in the gold mine strikes, and more than 350 injured, with fractured skulls, ruptured spleens, and dog bites, since the police were called in.

What can one say about these violent demonstrations? First, they are not at all surprising. They have been happening off and on for a very long time. There is a long history here. They are a manifestation of anger and frustration. I will not dwell on what may be very obvious generalizations, but I do think it would be useful to refer to the observation of the Minister of Law and Order, who said that he believed unidentified people and organizations had caused the demonstrations to coincide with the inauguration of the new constitution, that they were not caused by the rent increases.

Well, I think they were, from all evidence, sparked by the rent rises; and the extensive boycotts in the schools, by specific grievances there. But there are historically long underlying political causes of very fundamental importance, and it is no coincidence that they did coincide with the inauguration of a new constitution.

Indeed, if everything that has been going on is, say, the responsibility of the ANC [African National Congress], that in itself would be quite a remarkable happening. I think they have been largely spontaneous, and such spontaneity can continue and spread, or it can be crushed or fizzle away.

"Soweto" was an event that went on for some 16 months. Some 700 deaths were publicly recorded. Officially, 575 died in the early period of Soweto, 134 under the age of 18.

In 1977, I had an opportunity to talk with black youth leaders who had left South Africa after Soweto, and they said one lesson they had learned was never again to allow a confrontation to arise in the streets that would result in blacks being shot down. It was necessary to engage in serious, careful, planned politicization and organization.

Does the ANC welcome the spontaneous rioting? No, I do not think so at all. They look upon this as a manifestation in the streets that can be crushed, that can thus dampen the spirit of re-

sistance. Crushing uprisings, more Sowetos, can be a serious political setback if the people believe the regime is impregnable.

And there are often times, in talking to ANC people, when comparisons are made with other revolutionary kinds of situations, for example, the crackdown by the French in Algeria in 1945 that resulted in a 10-year setback.

In a sense, ANC leaders believe that the government welcomes violence in the streets because it does provide opportunities to crush the demonstrators and produce a setback, though on the other hand it is a tremendous embarrassment on this occasion.

I think also what is happening does strengthen the position of those elements in the African National Congress who have been arguing for escalating the armed struggle to include soft targets. By soft targets I mean nonmilitary, nonpolice targets, South African men and perhaps women, depending upon where they are to be found.

So, there are these pressures in the ANC. But for a long period of time their sabotage has been a kind of armed propaganda.

It has escalated to the point where armed officers and police are targets. It has not gone beyond that. There has not been indiscriminate killing of whites, which would be very easy to do in South Africa. If you can bomb a nuclear powerplant, you can much more easily bomb a cinema, and that has not happened.

There has been a great deal of restraint. Perhaps we could discuss that more if you would like.

Another observation to make about these demonstrations is that there simply is no structure in South Africa for consultation with popular and credible leaders. The Minister of Law and Order and three other ministers toured the townships.

They consulted with the Lekoa Town Council, which in December 1983, was elected by a 14.7-percent vote. The vote in Soweto was 10.9 percent. Its members are held in open contempt, according to Allister Sparks, a South African journalist of some distinction, and they were the chief targets of anger, and yet these were the men who were being consulted.

Another point. The violence is also evidence of the difficulties involved in building a black middle class, one that identifies its interests with those of the whites, because what has also happened is that there has been a marked rise in spontaneous action against community councilors and also black businessmen who are seen as collaborators. Also some attacks on Indian shops.

It may also be true that to some extent we are seeing the opposition of the haves against the have nots at a time of unemployment and severe recession.

One of the possible future reforms in South Africa is modification of the Group Areas Act to allow well-to-do blacks to live in white areas. President Botha in his inaugural address said permits may eventually be granted for some black workers to live in whites-only residential areas. Some blacks might welcome that, but how could such blacks take a leadership role in the townships?

There has been much discussion today about the constitution. Just very, very briefly, let me note that the boycott which was called by the United Democratic Front, the National Forum, by Chief Buthelezi himself, the Inkatha movement, by the Federation

of South African Trade Unions, and many other groups was indeed a substantial success.

Some 30 percent of registered colored voters voted. That is about 18 percent of eligible colored voters. Heavier in the rural areas than in the more politicized urban areas. In some places around Capetown as low as 4 percent. Among Indians, 20 percent of registered voters voted. Fewer, a lower percentage of eligible voters.

Mr. Rajbansi, who is now in the cabinet, in his constituency, where 14.1 percent of the registered voters voted, himself won less than half of that vote. In one Indian constituency, the winner won one vote. In two other districts, winners won two votes.

Part of the fascination of South Africa is that a great deal is happening. There is a great deal of flux. The government is buffeted. It is under great pressure. It does respond to pressure. I am almost glad that the constitution was adopted, simply as an academic observer to see what will happen.

One South African also in this room has recently written in Fortune magazine that he expected the two black members of the cabinet to have substantial portfolios, but the two members of the cabinet have been appointed without portfolio.

And President Botha said with regard to Reverend Hendrickse and Mr. Rajbansi, "If I find a colored or Indian member capable of handling a portfolio, I will not hesitate to appoint him."

In line with what Secretary Crocker said—there is a silver lining to everything, I guess—the pressure is on them to do what they can to establish some degree of credibility.

And yet how much can one expect from the leader of the Colored Labor Party? He has asked overseas countries for a moratorium of 5 years on boycotts and isolation of South Africa. In an interview with the Afrikaans paper Rapport, he says, "If we have not achieved our objective over the next 5 years, then we must get out, and say we tried, but it just does not work."

But what are his objectives? Well, he wants to start with what is possible, repeal of the law regarding political interference, and perhaps he does deserve some credit for having appealed to Indians to join the Colored Labor Party.

But the main objective is the repeal of the Immorality Act and of the law prohibiting mixed marriages. I have been predicting for years that these would be repealed, and I have been wrong so far.

I think that repeal of those two laws would be quite dramatic. They would have an influence on white thinking over a long period of time. They would produce a sensation abroad, contribute to wishful thinking abroad, but really do very little, nothing to affect the balance of power.

Mr. Hendrickse said it is nonsense to expect the government to abolish the Group Areas Act immediately. But he hopes there will be no proclamations and that law should be sympathetically applied. He is going to seek to get blacks central representation, but he says nothing about the pass laws and so forth.

I shall take just 1 minute to read a page in which I have summarized some trends of the past 4 years with regard to important structural and noncosmetic changes which are being made that may enhance the government's potential for winning some black cooperation and therefore giving it some appearance of legitimacy.

The government is extending privileges not only to coloreds and Indians, but also to Africans who are needed, skilled as well as unskilled workers in the cities. At the same time, it is more strictly controlling access to the urban areas by the large majority of Africans who are not needed there. The government is seeking to increase the proportion of commuters and migrants.

Virtually no new family housing for Africans is being built in the urban areas. In 1982, the government reinstated the labor preference for coloreds in the Western Cape and restricted the construction of family housing for Africans there.

Africans in Capetown, in contrast to other areas, cannot get 99-year leasehold rights to housing. And earlier this year, the government confirmed plans eventually, during the next decade or so, to move all of Capetown's 250,000 Africans to a barren area 25 miles from the city, although they will make it not barren.

Meanwhile, the migrant jobs are declining in number as the economy becomes more capital intensive. The government is also proceeding with its resettlement policy, 3½ million people in the last two decades, and 2 million still to go. Those not needed in the cities or on increasingly mechanized white farms, known as redundant or surplus people, are dumped out of sight.

While real wages do improve for many urban Africans and for rural families who receive cash remittances from men working in the cities, severe poverty is intensifying for the great mass of Africans in the overpopulated rural areas. These areas may become the main breeding grounds for future guerrillas.

These generalizations have been demonstrated in the recent conference of the very important Carnegie Corp.'s 3-year study on black poverty, which should be through in another year. But unlike the—I interject this—unlike their study of poor whites in the early 1930's—there they dealt with poor people who had the franchise—here they are dealing, it goes without saying, to poor people who don't.

Another fundamental source of deep grievance is continuing: the denationalization of Africans as a result of homeland or national state independence. Four homelands have become formally independent thus far, and 8 million Africans have lost their citizenship. Denationalization undermines any eventual possibility of extending full political participation, that is, through the franchise at the national level to those who have become denationalized.

Given the process of denationalization that has been going on and is continuing, it is difficult to see how Secretary Crocker can maintain, as he has, that South Africa is "certainly closer" to "equal political participation" now than it has been for 30 years.

Meanwhile, the government's homeland structures, whether formally independent or not, absorb energies, develop attachments to the status quo, divide the black opposition to white rule, and increasingly play a role in counterinsurgency.

So what we have, then, in these 4 years is a combination of reform and repression. There is a great deal of dispute about the direction of that reform and whether or not there is a hidden agenda. I shall briefly summarize some of my own opinions on this.

First, a couple of questions. During the past 4 years, has there been any sign of change in the direction of official policy away

from white supremacy and from African denationalization and in the direction of a universal franchise and some form of majority rule? The answer is no.

Mr. Crocker has advocated negotiation with freely chosen representatives of blacks or, as he said today, valid black interlocutors should come to the table.

Has there been any opening of the political process for Africans? Has there been any beginning of a rollback of the police state legislation of the past three decades? No. This would be one prerequisite if leaders who are to be seen as real leaders are to arise.

What is happening is that whites act unilaterally in planning political change. The government has developed no effective or institutionalized channels for consultation with Africans of popular credibility who do not participate in officially sponsored institutions. There simply is no institutionalized way in which dialog between whites and Africans outside officially sponsored institutions can take place. Efforts by Dr. Koornhof some years ago to establish urban advisory committees simply did not accomplish this.

The cabinet-level committee on the future of urban Africans has not attracted any cooperation as far as I know. Apparently the committee will listen to any African who wants to testify before it, but this is not dialog on an equal basis, nor is there much likelihood that popular leaders will testify.

An indication of the government's distance from any national—meaning not ethnic, but countrywide association of Africans—is the fact that Dr. Koornhof will meet individual urban council leaders, men who are widely despised by Africans, men who have formed a national body, but he will not meet with them as members of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa.

I want to limit my remarks, and so let me just mention some developments without amplifying them of the past 4 years.

Senator TSONGAS. If I might, Madam Chairman, I have a conflict of schedule. I would like to ask a couple of questions along the way.

Can you tell me how much longer your remarks will be?

Mr. KARIS. Could I take 10 minutes more?

Senator KASSEBAUM. What is your time schedule?

Senator TSONGAS. I think the rule was 10 minutes total. We do have a time dilemma, Madam Chairman.

Senator KASSEBAUM. All right. Perhaps you could briefly summarize and we can elaborate on our questions.

Mr. KARIS. I can do it in less than 10 minutes. I will take just a few minutes.

These trends I simply want to tick off, because they might elicit questions.

First, the resurgence of the African National Congress.

Second, the government's campaign of destabilization of its neighbors aimed at eliminating the African National Congress, which culminated in the Nkomati Accord of earlier this year. This has given Mozambique some breathing space and has a been a setback for the ANC. But the Nkomati Accord does nothing to lessen black opposition to government policy within South Africa. On the contrary, it is seen by the government as a vindication of its policies. And it is resulting in less centrally controlled ANC activity within South Africa. Other important developments are the rise in

1983 of the United Democratic Front, the largest multiracial coalition since the 1950's, a resurgent black consciousness, evident in the National Forum, and the continued rise of black trade unions.

I think, Senator Tsongas, I will just skip over the summary I have here of repressive policies and conclude by listing, without much comment, 10 assumptions or emphases of constructive engagement which I think are dubious at best or wrong.

The first is an assumption that countering Soviet influence and involvement in southern Africa is of higher priority for American policy than avoiding the danger of the United States becoming identified with the South African regime. I think there is little question that the wide perception among black leaders is that the United States is aligned with this government, despite the sophistication of Secretary Crocker's concern about being so identified, and despite his opposition to a de facto alliance.

However one might describe that alliance or that relationship, the popular perception, I think, is well known.

Second, constructive engagement emphasizes white perceptions to the neglect of black perceptions. It has a sensitivity to whites that it does not have to blacks. In seeing the new constitution as a step in the right direction, it simply overlooks the historic length of separation and exclusion of which this is, for Africans, a culmination.

Although from the standpoint of whites, it is a dramatic change that coloreds and Indians are members of a tricameral parliament, we should not forget that coloreds were on the common voters roll from the 1850's until the 1950's, and in that sense are not as far ahead politically in the central parliament as they were then.

Third, constructive engagement exaggerates the importance, I think, of the verligtes within the National Party. There is much wishful thinking about the verligtes and the reformers. Nearly all of them fall short of aiming at universal suffrage and some form of majority rule.

I think there is a misplaced belief that there is a hidden agenda to move toward genuine political power sharing.

Fourth, constructive engagement overemphasizes the military element in the struggle between white power and the black challenge. I think Secretary Crocker sets up straw men when he talks about the inability of the black opposition to mount "a direct assault on white power." African National Congress leaders look upon the "arms struggle" as a minor element of their strategy in comparison with many other tactics. Constructive engagement also underemphasizes the potential threat to white power of boycotts, noncooperation, strikes, and stopping the economy from functioning.

Fifth, it also assumes that an endless timetable is available. So while denationalization and so forth are going on, there is growing black alienation from whites, maybe to some extent from coloreds and Indians, black/white polarization, and divisiveness among blacks themselves.

Sixth, there is the assumption that political demands are of low priority in comparison with economic and social demands. According to the New York Times, the Reagan administration has partially funded the study reported on Sunday on black attitudes toward

disinvestment. There is an underemphasis on African political activity and its importance for over a century; certainly an underemphasis of the importance for the franchise.

Seventh, constructive engagement advocates negotiations with freely chosen representatives, but as I said earlier, there is an underemphasis, no emphasis, on the importance of the prerequisites for such negotiation.

Eighth, it underemphasizes the importance and appeal of the ANC. It seems to recognize the legitimacy and popularity of the ANC, though constructive engagement spokesmen do not advocate the kinds of measures that would enable the ANC to reenter the political process. Rather, the emphasis seems to be to encourage the rise of internal black elites which will splinter the support for the ANC and make it irrelevant.

Incidentally, in emphasizing peaceful change, there is an assumption that violence by the government is legitimate, but not violence by the resistance.

Ninth, there is an assumption that any policy other than constructive engagement would encourage the radical opposition in such a way that there would be political disintegration, chaos, and Communist advantage.

And, finally, constructive engagement underemphasizes the effectiveness of pressures affecting South African policies and overemphasizes quiet diplomatic persuasion. South Africa indeed does respond to pressure.

So I conclude with one sentence, by saying that it is difficult not to reach the conclusion that 4 more years of constructive engagement will result in more reform and more repression—reform that will feed wishful thinking abroad while aiming at further entrenchment of white supremacy, although there is an inner dynamic that can get out of hand—growing black alienation from whites, greater polarization, more violence, and a still closer identification of the United States with the South African regime.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Dr. Karis.

Ambassador Newsom, I would like to ask you first, because you stated in your testimony that regarding disengagement or disinvestment, you had never been certain either of the feasibility in practice or their ultimate impact on the situation in South Africa.

And drawing on your past experience as Assistant Secretary in this area, I am sure, like those who have been involved for some time with the policy, those of us who perhaps have come to it much later, we end up very frustrated in the type of effective leverage that can be used in South Africa for change, because we have no military assistance programs to South Africa, really no major economic assistance programs with the Government of South Africa, only some $5 million in funding for the various scholarships and humanitarian programs.

I think this is something that a lot of people overlook when they urge different types of action—what leverage. And I wonder if you have any suggestions for any possible leverage that you see, or Dr. Karis, too, because it is one thing to talk about some of these things and another to really see the implementation as being very effective.

Ambassador NEWSOM. Madam Chairman, my own impression, again from some time back, and as one who visited South Africa while in office, was of the tremendous eagerness of the South African Government, the South African leaders, to be accepted by the United States and to have their view of their role in the area accepted.

Even 10 years ago and 20 years ago, they wanted us to see their role in southern Africa as part of the global confrontation between the Western nations and the Soviet Union and its surrogates. But like other countries that have wanted us to adopt that point of view toward regional events, they would then—it was always my feeling—take that approbation of their policies and use it for their own regional purposes.

Even in a fairly conservative administration, the first Nixon administration, we successfully—I think—resisted efforts to, in effect, concur in that view of South Africa's role. I think this was a form of pressure. I think it remains a form of pressure.

I think that like so many other foreign policies in the Reagan administration, a policy toward Africa has evolved back to the kind of maneuverable middle where so much of American foreign policy ultimately lands. But I do think, having been in the transition, that, whether intentionally or not, the new administration gave certain signals to South Africa through some of those who visited South Africa during the transition period, and through some of the early statements that were made, that here, at last, was an administration that accepted South Africa's view of the struggle in southern Africa and its view of the world

I think that removed a considerable amount of leverage. I think the direct linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the Namibia question was another signal in that direction. I think that, as I said in my statement, politically in this country one cannot avoid the conclusion that ultimately somehow these two things have to take place relatively close together for a Namibia settlement to be acceptable politically in the United States. But I am not sure that they need it to be as formally linked.

And I would have been concerned, had I been in office at that time, that such a formal link would give a signal of the approbation of South African policies which removed our leverage from us, leverage that we had because of South Africa's eagerness to have us see the world in their terms.

Now, as far as disengagement and disinvestment is concerned, I have two reasons for my skepticism about their effectiveness. The first is, perhaps, one that is more in the domain of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee than it is within mine, and that is that I do not realistically see the kind of legislative measures that would be necessary to withdraw and to prevent U.S. investment in South Africa passing through the Congress, in any Congress that I can currently visualize.

But what is more important, it may seem to some like a new debate, but the debate over disengagement and disinvestment has been going on since the early 1960's, and I have sat in this seat on previous occasions and have discussed the same issues.

I do think that the presence of our diplomats in South Africa—and I have known many—has permitted us to give that kind of

signal of interest, disidentification, and concern that it is necessary for this country to give in that kind of a situation.

Some of those who have served in our Embassies have had the most remarkable relationships under often difficult circumstances with black leaders in South Africa. I spent 10 days during my time as Assistant Secretary with a prominent black American touring South Africa, with doors opened by the kinds of contacts which our Embassy people had.

But second, I also feel that many of the American businesses, from my observation, were in the forefront of adopting policies which were opening doors in South Africa that might not otherwise have been open.

But finally—and this is perhaps a somewhat cynical remark—I also had the impression that if we were to pull out our investment, while it might be a matter of satisfaction and poltical popularity in this country, it would not be very long before the remaining assets were frozen and other countries in Europe and Asia would step in to pick up that investment.

That is a long answer. I am sorry.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much.

I would like to ask you a question regarding Namibia. From your point of view, do you believe South Africa is really sincere in wanting to see an independent Namibia? You mentioned the withdrawal of the Cuban troops. Might there not have been something else that would have come up as an impediment to the process whether or not the Cuban troops were part of the equation back here?

Ambassador NEWSOM. I share the perhaps implied skepticism in that question. But there is another aspect. It is hard not to bring in political considerations when one is in these chambers.

While I was Assistant Secretary under a Republican administration, I was the Under Secretary of State in the Carter administration. I observed the efforts of Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Moose and Ambassador McHenry in working closely with the Contact Group to bring about a solution to the Namibia question.

I happen to think they were much closer to a solution than they have been given credit for. I can remember very clearly the change in South African attitudes between the time we prepared for the January meeting in Geneva in 1981 and the time that the meeting actually took place, and an American election took place in between.

I think that there could have been continued progress along the lines that the Contact Group was working. I think that the South Africans saw in the election an opportunity to pull back from that, to bring in other considerations. That relieved them of some other pressures they were under in the Carter administration.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you see a danger in getting bogged down in Namibia, as I asked Dr. Crocker? And from your past experience, Namibia was a focal point of policy then. Was this necessary that it become the focal point, or is there some danger of being distracted by it?

Ambassador NEWSOM. I think a solution to the Namibia question is important. Unless there is so drastic a decline in the interest of the front line nations in a solution to this problem that the pressures are off, I think our relations with those countries, plus the

fact that this is an illegal occupation in international law terms, is going to continue to impel us to work toward a Namibia solution.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Just briefly, Dr. Karis, I would like to ask you this. You mentioned the United Democractic Front. It has gained a great deal of support and recognition because it has brought a number of diverse groups together. How do you see it working as a force within South Africa? Might it become a stronger force, from your observation, than the ANC? What is the counterbalance there? Is there a working relationship between the two? How do you analyze that?

Mr. KARIS. The effort of the United Democratic Front [UDF] is to provide the widest possible umbrella for opposition to the new constitution and to some legislation that was pending early last year and is pending in a different form now. So it did arise in response to what was seen as a new threat.

I think the spread ideologically, as well as racially, ethnically, of the groups that are a part of this very loose federation, now of some 500 organizations, is very, very wide. For example, the UDF does not insist upon adherence to the ANC's freedom charter.

On the other hand, clearly, the persons who are patrons and so forth, Nelson Mandela himself, are ANC leaders. I think the most interesting feature of the UDF to emphasize is that it is based upon a very large number of groups, many of them seeking to build up from the community level.

It is difficult to see that it is the kind of organization that is going to mount an orchestrated challenge to the overwhelming power of the state. It is concerned more with politicization and demonstration.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would agree with that—that it in itself can be a positive effort, particularly if it does not become one that is merely seeking to disrupt, but to gather together some of the diverse opposition from a grass roots level.

Mr. KARIS. Yes. I might add that some of its leading figures have also been involved in the so-called National Forum, which is not really quite an organization, but a coming together at different times of groups whose orientation might be historically linked more to the black consciousness stream of thinking.

It is a great mistake, I think, for outsiders analyzing ideological statements to exaggerate differences among blacks in South Africa. There certainly are differences, personal and ideological and so on. But the historic push—and to a greater extent than I think is appreciated—is toward arriving at a common denominator of unity. Certainly on the new constitution, the only black leader of any prominence that I can think of who supported the new constitution was President Sebe of the Ciskei, which one can objectively say is a viscious and corrupt homeland state.

And yet, it is a sign of the divisiveness which is developing in recent years within the black community; whereas historically, one can point to great conferences going back to 1909 which have brought together black leaders across the entire spectrum on critical occasions. Now, on the occasion of a constitution which black leaders see, African leaders see as a constitutionalizing of their separation and exclusi[illegible]it has been impossible to bring the full spectrum together. I am [illegible]nking of Chief Buthelezi and President Ma-

tanzima and others who are split off from the omnibus-seeking efforts of the UDF and the National Forum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Speaking of Chief Buthelezi, do you see any support for or possibility of his federalist concept, rather than the separate and independent homelands as nations such as our own relationship between States and the Federal Government?

Mr. KARIS. I think the one great plus for Chief Buthelezi, the one piece of credit that one must give him, thinking of his role in South Africa, is that he has withstood all the efforts to have KwaZulu move toward independence, although developments in KwaZulu and governmental organization there make his functioning seem not very much different from that of other national states. I think for a long time there has been the assumption, with much validity to it, that he was the kind of black leader with roots in the ANC, a genuine Christian, opposed to violence, to whom whites could turn. But polarization involving him has increased.

More and more, I think that Chief Buthelezi, for whom I have had a great deal of admiration and still do in many ways today, is a tragic figure. He is a very important Zulu leader. His Inkatha Organization is a national organization which has some small percentage, a small number of non-Zulu members. He has strong support, especially among rural Zulus. Among the more militant or radical younger blacks, his support has been decreasing for quite some time.

Meanwhile, his own claims for membership have risen in little more than a year and a half from 360,000 to over 900,000, claims which seem to me to be dubious.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much. Both of you have added considerably to the hearings today. I think your thoughts and observations from many years of experience, both in the diplomatic front and the educational front, are very important to us and I thank you very much for sharing your time with us.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]